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BETWEEN LAW AND DIPLOMACY: THE
CONUNDRUM OF COMMON LAW IMMUNITY
Chimène I. Keitner
Drawing the line between disputes that can be
adjudicated in domestic (U.S.) courts and those that
cannot has perplexed judges and jurists since the
Founding Era. Although Congress provided a statutory
framework for the jurisdictional immunities of foreign
states in 1976, important ambiguities remain. Notably,
in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Samantar v.
Yousuf that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) does not govern suits against foreign officials
unless the foreign state is the “real party in interest.”
This decision clarified, but did not fully resolve,
conceptual and doctrinal questions surrounding the
immunities of foreign officials whose conduct is
challenged in U.S. courts and who do not fall within
existing statutes. The original research and analysis
offered in this Article provides the necessary foundation
for approaching, and ultimately answering, persistent
questions about what common law immunity entails.
This research reveals that the deferential judicial
posture of the 1940s was an aberration and that courts
retain the authority to assess the rationales for varying
degrees of judicial deference in different types of cases.
Unpacking these cases points strongly towards the
conclusion that, although the Executive Branch remains
best situated to assess the potential foreign policy
consequences of pending litigation, courts are ultimately
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responsible for making jurisdictional determinations,
including decisions regarding common law immunity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The question whether, and in what circumstances, jurisdictional
immunities shield foreign officials from proceedings in U.S. courts
has perplexed jurists since the Founding Era.1 Yet the Supreme
Court has addressed this issue only once in living memory.2 In
Samantar v. Yousuf, the Court held that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) does not govern suits against foreign
officials unless the foreign state is the “real party in interest.”3
Although this decision clarified where the U.S. law of foreign official
immunity cannot be found, it said little about where such law can
be found, absent an applicable statute.4 Lower courts have thus
been left to figure out what the non-statutory law of foreign official
immunity entails.5
The doctrine of foreign state immunity—which is distinct from
but related to foreign official immunity—rests on the proposition
that one country cannot exercise jurisdiction over another without
violating the core principle par in parem no habet imperium (“an
equal has no power over an equal”).6 In practice, however, the
1 See generally Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official Immunity,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 704 (2012) (exploring 1790s cases in detail).
2 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (finding that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) governs the immunities of foreign states, not foreign officials).
At the time of writing, a petition for certiorari was pending in another foreign official
immunity case, Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142 (D.C. Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19185 (U.S. Aug. 9, 2019).
3 Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325.
4 See id. at 315 (clarifying that a broad reading “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign
state to include foreign officials as inconsistent with congressional intent). The Diplomatic
Relations Act of 1978 governs the immunities of diplomatic and consular officials. See 22
U.S.C. § 254(a)–(e) (2012).
5 See, e.g., Lewis, 918 F.3d at 142; Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d. 888 (9th Cir. 2019);
Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 Fed. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014); Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763 (4th
Cir. 2012). For scholarly contributions to the conversation about how to adjudicate immunity
claims, see Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 851 (2011); Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official
Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2719–20 (2011); Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official
Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J.
INT’L L. 915, 976 (2011); Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity after Samantar: A
United States Government Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1142 (2011); John B.
Bellinger III, The Dog That Caught the Car: Observations on the Past, Present, and Future
Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts Immunities, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 835 (2011).
6 Yoram Dinstein, Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium, 1 ISR. L. REV. 407, 413 (1966).
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pervasiveness of cross-border travel and commerce creates a
demand for the adjudication of transnational disputes in domestic
courts, including disputes involving the activities of foreign states.7
Litigation involving foreign states and foreign officials can carry
implications for the Executive Branch’s conduct of foreign relations.
As a policy matter, the United States’ interest in providing a forum
for vindicating the legal rights of its citizens and residents, and
ensuring accountability for unlawful conduct, weighs against
special treatment for foreign official defendants in U.S. courts. On
the other hand, concerns about creating diplomatic tensions and
legitimizing legal proceedings against U.S. officials in foreign courts
pull in the opposite direction.
To determine the contours of foreign official immunity and the
circumstances in which it can be invoked, one must first identify the
source of the applicable law. The Samantar opinion offers scant
guidance on this point. The Court indicated that “[t]he doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity developed as a matter of common law
long before the FSIA was enacted in 1976,” but it devoted less than
one page to describing that development, which was not material to
its interpretation of the scope of the FSIA.8 However, tracing the
common law development of this doctrine is required to determine
what “the common law of official immunity,” which the Court
identified as governing the immunities of foreign officials, entails.9
This Article draws on original archival research to provide the most
comprehensive available account of the genesis of the doctrine of
common law immunity from civil suit in U.S. courts.
Although “the common law of official immunity” referred to in
the Samantar opinion cannot necessarily be reduced to historical
7 In 1956, Philip Jessup coined the term “transnational law” to refer to law that “regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers.” PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW
2 (1956); see also Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law (commenting on Jessup’s conclusions
about “the inseparability of the issues that underlie the allegedly ‘domestic’ versus the
likewise purely ‘international’ constellations”), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (J.
Smits ed., 2006).
8 Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311. The FSIA is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602−1611 (2006).
9 Samantar, 560 U.S. at 320; cf. Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S.
Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern
Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1538 (2011) (explaining that “the Court’s discussion
of the pre-FSIA regime leaves no doubt that it regarded the relevant law as federal, not State,
law” and that “the opinion is probably best read to leave open . . . all other questions about
the nonstatutory immunity of foreign officials apart from its federal nature”).
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practice, it is certainly informed by it. This practice, in turn, was
heavily influenced by judicial understandings of the requirements
of international law.10 Because the Samantar Court took the
position that the FSIA left the “common law of official immunity”
unchanged, the question naturally arises: unchanged from what?
The Executive Branch has, in recent years, asserted that it is
entitled to absolute judicial deference if it informs a U.S. court that
a current or former foreign official enjoys jurisdictional immunity
for his or her conduct.11 As Department of Justice attorney Lewis
Yelin, writing in his personal capacity, has indicated, “[a]lthough
denominated a ‘suggestion’ of immunity, the government’s filing
informs the courts that the Executive Branch’s immunity
determination is binding.”12 As I have previously recounted,
however, this position is radically different from that of the
Executive Branch in the Founding Era, which disclaimed the
authority to instruct courts to dismiss claims on immunity
grounds.13
This Article is divided into several main parts. Part I introduces
the doctrines of foreign state immunity and foreign sovereign
immunity. Part II excavates the practices and understandings
associated with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cases that
challenged U.S. jurisdiction over claims involving foreign states. It

10 As David Golove and Daniel Hulsebosch have noted, “[t]he commitment of the Founders,
especially the Federalists, to the law of nations is difficult to miss in the historical sources.”
David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Law of Nations and the Constitution: An Early
Modern Perspective, 106 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1607 (2018). Early cases illustrate “the wide
consensus among judges, lawyers, and government officials in the early Republic that the law
of nations was part of the law of the land and would be enforced by the judiciary as such.” Id.
at 1640. The cases discussed here form an integral part of the U.S. “common law” corpus of
authoritative judicial opinions on foreign official immunity, even though they draw on
law-of-nations principles rather than the English common law.
11 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14,
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (No. 08-1555), 2010 WL 342031 at *10 (“FSIA left
in place the pre-existing practice of recognizing official immunity in accordance with
suggestions of immunity by the Executive Branch.”); Doğan v. Barak, No. 2:15-CV-08130ODW(GSJx), 2016 WL 6024416, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2016) (explaining that “the Executive
[generally] recommend[s] that the court either grant or deny immunity” and that courts
“consistently . . . defer[] to the decisions of the political branches” to “avoid embarrassing or
antagonizing the Executive in its conduct of foreign affairs”).
12 Lewis Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 911, 915 n.15 (2011).
13 See, e.g., Suits Against Foreigners, Case of Collot, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45 (1794); Actions
Against Foreigners, Case of Sinclair, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797); see generally Keitner, supra
note 1 (unearthing and examining Founding Era cases brought against foreign officials in
U.S. courts).
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focuses on doctrinally significant cases that have been cited in
subsequent judicial opinions but are not well-documented or
explored in the literature. It also revisits better-known cases in light
of newly unearthed docket entries and diplomatic correspondence
and explores the interplay between legal and diplomatic
considerations in the resolution of these disputes.
Part III extends the historical narrative to encompass the
twentieth century and recounts the previously untold backstories of
a trilogy of cases involving foreign ships. In the latter two cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court accepted a new, more robust role for the
Executive Branch in making binding immunity determinations.14
These cases form the touchstone of the Executive Branch’s current
view that it is entitled to absolute judicial deference in cases
involving claims to non-statutory forms of immunity. Part IV
concludes.
Judicial deference to Executive Branch determinations
regarding foreign ships does not self-evidently compel absolute
deference in cases involving foreign officials. This is especially true
where a foreign official’s entitlement to immunity does not turn on
whether the Executive Branch has recognized him or her as a bona
fide representative of a foreign state. The question of degree of
deference is more than merely academic. Although cases against
foreign officials were relatively sparse during most of the twentieth
century,15 the advent of modern human rights litigation
inaugurated a new wave of cases against foreign officials for conduct
such as torture16 and genocide.17 Today, in the twenty-first century,
privately initiated civil suits continue to be brought against current
and former foreign officials in the United States for conduct ranging
from torture, war crimes, and kidnapping to domestic worker
See infra Section III.A.2.
A compilation of the State Department’s immunity decisions from 1952 to 1977 contains
110 decisions, only four of which involved individual defendants who claimed immunity on
the grounds that they had acted on behalf of a foreign state. See Sovereign Immunity
Decisions of the Department of State from May 1952 to January 1977, 1977 DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1017, 1020.
16 See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 provides federal jurisdiction “whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with
process by an alien within our borders”).
17 See Kadic v. Karaǆić, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing how federal common
law immunity may apply to a United Nations’ invitee).
14
15
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abuse.18 In a case decided in August 2019 by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the panel declined to decide “the level
of deference owed to the State Department’s suggestion of
immunity” because giving the suggestion either “substantial
weight” or “absolute deference” would have yielded the same result
of dismissal.19 At the time of writing, a petition for certiorari was
pending in another case in which the D.C. Circuit found that the
defendants were “not entitled to foreign official immunity under the
common law,”20 in part because the State Department “never issued
a request that the District Court surrender its jurisdiction.”21
The development of common law immunity doctrine by the courts
should take account of the historical immunity practice elucidated
here. This research shows that the deferential judicial posture of
the 1940s was an aberration and that courts remain free to examine
the rationales for varying degrees of judicial deference in different
types of cases. By holding that “common law immunity” may apply
in cases against foreign officials, the Samantar Court evoked—
although it did not explore—a long line of cases that have straddled,
and sometimes blurred, the border between law and diplomacy.22
These cases point strongly towards the conclusion that, although
the Executive Branch remains best situated to assess the potential
foreign policy consequences of pending litigation, courts are

18 For a sampling of headlines arising from such cases, see Susan Farbstein & Tyler
Giannini, Clinic’s Case Against Former Bolivian President for Role in 2003 Massacre to
Proceed to Trial, HUM. RTS. @ HARV. L. (Feb. 20, 2018), http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/alien-tortstatute/clinics-case-against-former-bolivian-president-for-role-in-2003-massacre-to-proceedto-trial/ (discussing a suit brought against a former Bolivian president regarding his role in
a 2003 massacre); Michael Booth, NJ Court Affirms Immunity for Israeli Judges in Child
Custody
Dispute,
N.J.
L.J.
(Feb.
6,
2018,
4:33
PM),
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/sites/njlawjournal/2018/02/06/nj-court-affirms-immunityfor-israeli-judges-in-child-custody-dispute/ (explaining that because the U.S. State
Department conferred conduct-based immunity on such institutions acting within their
official capacities, the court held the plaintiff could not sue an Israeli court); Kaelyn Forde,
Nannies Suing Diplomat Were “Lured to the US,” Endured “Grueling” Conditions, Complaint
Says, ABC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017, 5:18 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nannies-suingdiplomat-lured-us-endured-grueling-conditions/story?id=50987486; Diane Taylor, Domestic
Workers Win Supreme Court Case Against Saudi Diplomat, GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/18/former-saudi-diplomat-does-not-haveimmunity-supreme-court-rules.
19 Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 2019).
20 Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-185
(U.S. Aug. 9, 2019).
21 Id. at 146.
22 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 (2010).
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ultimately responsible for making jurisdictional determinations,
including decisions regarding immunity.
II. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
During the Founding Era, a select group of lawyers and
statesmen faced the task of establishing the United States as a
full-fledged member of the community of “civilized nations.”23
Jurisdictional disputes in matters involving foreign countries
presented some of the most challenging, and potentially disruptive,
questions for the new legal and political system they helped create.
As the cases explored in this Part illustrate, many of the themes
that emerged during this formative period and in the century that
followed continue to animate debates about the contours of foreign
official immunity today.
Every assertion of jurisdiction is a claim of legitimate authority;
conversely, every assertion of immunity is a claim to exemption
from the exercise of that authority. The baseline assumption in
international law has long been that claims relating to persons,
property, or activities within a country’s territory fall within the
jurisdiction of that country’s courts.24 As Chief Justice Marshall
pronounced in an 1812 Supreme Court case, The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”25 Yet, in the same
opinion, Chief Justice Marshall held that friendly foreign states,
including their heads of state and ambassadors, should be exempt
from this general rule.26 He reasoned that a sovereign would only
enter foreign territory “in the confidence that the immunities
belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not
23 For an in-depth development of this thesis, see David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch,
A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of
International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934 (2010); see also Anne-Marie Burley, The
Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461,
493 (1989).
24 See Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes,
and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 816 (2011) (discussing how
international law considers “the domestic courts of the state where the human rights violation
or international crime occurred” to be a “primary” location for judicial enforcement).
25 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
26 Id. at 137.
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expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be
extended to him.”27 This tension between the territorial sovereignty
of the forum state and the idea that exercising jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign “degrade[s] the dignity of his nation”28 remains
central to disputes over the scope of foreign state and foreign official
immunities.
Historical accounts of foreign sovereign immunity in U.S. courts
generally start with The Schooner Exchange and focus on cases
involving competing claims to vessels and their cargo.29 Yet cases
involving individuals as defendants were not unknown in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as this Part explores.
Although it would be anachronistic to transpose the understandings
animating those cases directly to the present day, I have suggested
in previous work that they nonetheless hold important insights for
questions such as how to conceptualize exercises of jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conduct,30 when to attribute officials’ conduct to the
state,31 and which types of disputes lie beyond domestic judicial
competence.32
Taken together, judicial opinions, Executive Branch documents,
and diplomatic correspondence from the Founding Era and the
Early Republic indicate that: (1) the Executive Branch believed the
separation of powers prevented it from instructing a court to dismiss
a case, even on immunity grounds; (2) foreign officials who were
invested with the capacity to represent their countries in foreign
relations enjoyed immunity from U.S. legal proceedings based on
their official status, but all other foreigners were on the same
jurisdictional footing as any other person hauled before a U.S. court;
and (3) the claim that the defendant had performed the challenged
acts in his official capacity on behalf of a foreign state did not
Id.
Id.
29 See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Foreign sovereign
immunity, insofar as American courts are concerned, has its doctrinal roots in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon.”); Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Before the FSIA,
courts determined the immunity of foreign sovereigns pursuant to principles announced by
Chief Justice John Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.”).
30 See generally Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transnational
Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 94 (2013).
31 See generally Chimène I. Keitner, Categorizing Acts by State Officials: Attribution and
Responsibility in the Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 451
(2016).
32 See generally Chimène I. Keitner, Adjudicating Acts of State, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 49 (John Norton Moore ed., 2013).
27
28
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provide a defense to jurisdiction, but it could serve as a substantive
defense on the merits. These understandings formed the pillars of
immunity determinations by U.S. courts well into the twentieth
century, when the first pillar came under strain, as explored in Part
III.
A. EXECUTIVE DISCLAIMERS: SINCLAIR AND COLLOT

Executive Branch officials in the fledgling United States
exhibited contradictory impulses to be responsive to—and to
avoid—diplomatic pressure from foreign states. Such pressures
could reach a fever pitch when foreign ships or foreign officials were
the subject of legal proceedings in U.S. courts. A handful of pivotal
cases established the template for the U.S. government’s response
to diplomatic protestations.
One of the earliest cases to raise these issues involved a private
suit against Captain Henry Sinclair, a British privateer, who
earned his living by capturing enemy ships and their cargo as prizes
of war.33 To avoid accusations of piracy, he cruised under the legal
authority conferred by a letter of marque issued by the High Court
of Admiralty in England.34 On March 17, 1797, Sinclair and his crew
captured and boarded the Atlantic, an American ship traveling from
the West Indies to Baltimore.35 Sinclair suspected that the Atlantic
was carrying enemy cargo, which he hoped to claim as a prize.36 He
would come to regret this encounter. A court at St. Kitts in the West
Indies cleared the Atlantic and its cargo rather than condemning it
as a prize, leaving Sinclair empty-handed.37 The Atlantic’s captain,
Henry Stockett, reported that the Atlantic was later re-captured by
33 Letter from R. Liston to Colonel Pickering, Sec’y of State (Dec. 15, 1797), microformed
on M50, Roll 3 (NARA Microfilm Publ’n) (on file with author) [hereinafter Liston to
Pickering]. For an exploration of all cases that could be located involving individual foreign
officials who were not consuls or diplomats, see generally Keitner, supra note 1. This Section
reprises key aspects of those cases and expands the analysis to include diplomatically
significant cases involving foreign consuls and foreign ships.
34 Liston to Pickering, supra note 33.
35 Memorial of Henry Sinclair, from Henry Sinclair to Robert Liston, His Britannick
Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States (Dec. 6, 1797), microformed on M50,
Roll 3 (NARA Microfilm Publ’n) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorial of Henry
Sinclair].
36 Id.
37 Id.
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two other ships, and he blamed Sinclair for diverting his route and
causing this misfortune.38 When Sinclair’s ship, the Swinger,
arrived in the port of Alexandria in Virginia eight months later,
Sinclair was arrested and imprisoned in the county jail.39 The
Atlantic’s owners, John Parnell and David Stewart of Baltimore,
had sued him for $20,000 in damages in a Virginia court, and he
was unable to post bail.40
Parnell and Stewart presumably viewed their ability to seek
judicial redress against Sinclair in a U.S. court as justified and
appropriate. But the lawsuit came as a thunderbolt to Sinclair.41
Plagued by anxiety about his future prospects, Sinclair penned a
detailed and impassioned memorial to Robert Liston, the British
Minister to the United States.42 Sinclair pleaded that his inability
to return immediately to “his customary occupation” of privateering
would reduce him “to entire ruin.”43 He blamed the French privateer
who had re-captured the Atlantic for destroying the “[l]etters and
[p]apers” that would have substantiated his original suspicion that
the Atlantic was carrying enemy goods ripe for capture.44 And
although he acknowledged—as alleged in the lawsuit—that he had
taken some property from the Atlantic when he boarded it, he
assured Liston that he had done so only because he was “in want of
[b]read” and that he had promised the Atlantic’s captain that he
would be reimbursed if the cargo were not condemned as a prize by
the admiralty court.45
At the most basic level, Sinclair could not understand why he was
being called to account for his conduct as a British privateer acting
under the authority of the British government in a U.S. court.46 If
his authority to capture ships came from the British government,
Sinclair pleaded to Liston, he should not be “amenable to the Laws
of the United States, but to those of his own Country, from whence

ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, Dec. 2, 1797, at 3.
FEDERAL GAZETTE & BALTIMORE DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 22, 1797, at 3. During this
period, defendants in civil suits could be detained by the sheriff if they were considered a
flight risk. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *281–83.
40 ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, Dec. 1, 1797, at 3.
41 Memorial of Henry Sinclair, supra note 35.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
38
39
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he received his Commission.”47 The whole point of a letter of
marque, as Liston subsequently emphasized in his report on the
matter to British Foreign Secretary William Grenville, was to
authorize Sinclair “to cruise [sic] against His Majesty’s enemy [and
to give him] a right to stop any ships which he might have cause to
suspect of having French or Spanish [enemy] goods on board.”48 If
Sinclair “had been guilty of any irregularity” in carrying out this
function, Liston continued, he could be punished by the British High
Court of Admiralty.49
Although the claim against Sinclair was brought by private
parties, Liston thought the U.S. government should intervene to
quash the suit to prevent any future “departure from the usage of
nations.”50 In an attempt to secure such intervention, he
transmitted Sinclair’s memorial to U.S. Secretary of State Timothy
Pickering, who, in turn, forwarded Liston’s letter and Sinclair’s
memorial to U.S. Attorney General Charles Lee.51 Pickering sought
Lee’s legal opinion on whether Sinclair was indeed entitled to “an
exemption from all responsibility in the case to the laws of any other
country than his own”52—that is, if he was answerable exclusively
to British authorities and not a U.S. court—and, if so, how the
Executive Branch should respond to the suit.
In crafting his response, Lee did not start from a blank slate.
Three years earlier, Attorney General William Bradford had
received a similar request to opine on a civil suit filed against Victor
Collot, the former Governor of Guadeloupe.53 Under the law of
nations, heads of state and diplomatic representatives
Id.
Letter from Robert Liston to Lord [Grenville] (Feb. 6, 1798) [hereinafter Liston to
Greenville], in British National Archives, F.O. 5/22, 94–95 (on file with author).
49 Id.
50 Id. By “the usage of nations,” Liston was invoking the authority of international law. As
Daniel Hulsebosch and David Golove have emphasized, “[f]ew maxims were more settled in
the eighteenth-century laws of war than that the validity of a prize captured on the high seas
was a matter for the captor nation’s courts alone”—a maxim that U.S. judges applied as “part
of the law of the United States.” See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1642. For more
on Founding Era understandings of the law of nations, see William S. Dodge, Customary
International Law, Change, and the Constitution, 106 GEO. L.J. 1560, 1569–72 (2018).
51 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles [Lee], Att’y Gen. (Dec. 23, 1797) [hereinafter
Pickering to Lee], in 10 DOMESTIC LETTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 276 (1943).
52 Id.
53 See William Bradford, Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45 (1794).
47
48
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(denominated “public ministers”) were entitled to absolute
immunity from foreign legal proceedings during their terms in
office.54 Collot, however, was neither a head of state nor a public
minister at the time he was sued. Instead, he was sued after having
surrendered to the British during their short-lived occupation of
Guadeloupe in 1794.55 The lawsuit alleged that Collot had abused
his authority as Governor to confiscate an American brig, the
Kitty.56 The Kitty’s captain, William Waters, filed suit against Collot
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.57 When Collot stopped in
Philadelphia en route back to France, the sheriff of Philadelphia
County arrested him on a writ of capias issued by the court that
required him to respond to the suit.58
Attorney General Bradford opined that “[w]ith respect to his
suability,” Collot “is on a footing with any other foreigner (not a
public minister) who comes within the jurisdiction of our courts.”59
A “public minister” (such as an ambassador or minister
plenipotentiary appointed to represent a foreign country) was
entitled to absolute, status-based immunity from foreign legal
proceedings during his term of appointment.60 Other foreign
officials, however, could not claim a similar exemption from U.S.
jurisdiction.61 Instead, they had to argue on the merits that they did
not bear personal responsibility for the challenged acts (here, the

54 See, e.g., 1 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 131 (1760)
(indicating that “[t]he consul is no public minister . . . and cannot pretend to the privileges
appertaining to such character”). On the distinction between “status-based” and
“conduct-based” immunity, see, for example, Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of
Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 62–66 (2010) (distinguishing between
status-based and conduct-based immunity), quoted in Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 772
(4th Cir. 2012). See also Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (distinguishing
between status-based and conduct-based immunity under the doctrine of common law foreign
immunity).
55 See George W. Kyte, A Spy on the Western Waters: The Military Intelligence Mission of
General Collot in 1796, 34 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 427, 430 n.9 (1947).
56 See Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247, 247 (Pa. 1796).
57 Id.
58 See V. Collot, Mon Arrestation dans les Etats-Unis de L’Amerique pour fait de mon
Administration (explaining that Collot was ill-received in Pennsylvania and, despite his claim
of innocence, was publicly arrested based on Captain Waters’ claim), in PRECIS DES
EVENEMENTS QUI SE SONT PASSES A LA GUADELOUPE PENDANT L’ADMINISTRATION DE GEORGE
HENRY VICTOR COLLOT 35, 35 (1795).
59 William Bradford, Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 46 (1794).
60 See Keitner, supra note 54, at 63 (explaining diplomatic immunity for “public
ministers”).
61 William Bradford, Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 46 (1794).
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confiscation of the Kitty) because they had acted on behalf of a
foreign state.62
Collot’s lack of status-based immunity did not necessarily mean
that Waters would prevail in seeking damages against him.
Notably, Bradford ventured that Collot could invoke the official
capacity in which he had acted as a defense on the merits because
“if the seizure of the vessel is admitted to have been an official act,
done by the defendant by virtue, or under color, of the powers vested
in him as governor, that it will of itself be a sufficient answer to the
plaintiff’s action.”63 Waters discontinued the suit before a trial could
take place, so there was no judgment on the merits.64 In
contemporary terms, although Collot attempted to invoke his
exercise of official capacity as a defense to the court’s jurisdiction,
Bradford believed that such a claim could instead provide an
affirmative defense on the merits. As a practical matter, this meant
that Collot could not seek a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction but
instead could move for summary judgment. To be successful,
however, he would have to show he had acted with actual, and not
merely apparent, authority.65
Three years after the Collot case, Secretary of State Pickering
asked Attorney General Lee to opine on how the United States
should respond to British Minister Liston’s diplomatic protests
about the suit against Sinclair.66 In providing his views, Lee
explicitly referenced Bradford’s prior opinion.67 Lee echoed
Bradford’s insistence that “the Executive cannot interpose with the
judiciary proceedings between an individual and Henry Sinclair,
whose controversy is entitled to a trial according to law.”68 Like
Bradford, however, Lee volunteered that Sinclair “ought to prevail”
at trial in light of the well-settled principle of admiralty law that “a
person acting under a commission from the sovereign of a foreign

Id.
Id.
64 Discontinuance, June 29, 1798, Pa. State Archives, RG-33, Records of the Sup. Ct. of
Pa., E. Dist., Discontinuance Papers, series #33.38 (Dec. 1796) (on file with author).
65 See Keitner, supra note 54, at 68–69 (explaining when foreign officials act under actual
or apparent authority).
66 Actions Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797).
67 Id.
68 Id.
62
63
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nation is not amenable for what he does in pursuance of his
commission, to any judiciary tribunal in the United States.”69 Lee
thus agreed with Bradford that a defendant’s claim that he acted on
behalf of a foreign state was not enough to support dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction. Instead, if substantiated, it could serve as a defense
on the merits. Although this response was well-founded doctrinally,
it was problematic because it left the defendant with the burdens of
litigation. These are precisely the burdens that individuals who
claimed they acted on behalf of foreign states argued they should
not have to bear.
The ability to raise a defense on the merits offered little comfort
to Sinclair, whose livelihood depended on his ability to return to sea
without waiting to be vindicated at trial. Eager to put an end to his
unexpected sojourn in the United States, he opted to settle the
claims against him.70 His willingness to settle was likely also
increased by his consciousness, acknowledged in his memorial, of
“some irregularity of conduct in having in fact carried off certain
articles from the American Ship.”71 This awareness facilitated a
negotiated settlement and averted further diplomatic friction.72 But
it also left unresolved the question of whether his “official capacity”
defense would have succeeded on the merits.
The Collot and Sinclair cases raised issues that remain salient
for U.S. courts today. At the most basic level, the initiation of civil
proceedings in the United States challenged the exclusive
jurisdiction of foreign admiralty courts. Viewed more broadly, such
proceedings raised the difficult question of whether, and under what
circumstances, U.S. courts could and should adjudicate the
lawfulness of acts performed under color of foreign law—and how to
make this decision. The plenary territorial jurisdiction conferred on
U.S. courts placed the burden on defendants to establish that they
were not properly subject to the courts’ adjudicatory authority.73
This, in turn, pressured the Executive Branch to devise strategies
for diffusing diplomatic pressures created by private litigation that

Id.
Memorial of Henry Sinclair, supra note 35.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“The defendant bears the
burden of proving foreign official immunity.”).
69
70
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implicated the interests of foreign states.74 It also put courts in the
difficult position of endeavoring to maintain a rules-based approach
to adjudication while considering the potential costs of proceeding
in diplomatically sensitive matters.75
B. EXECUTIVE SUGGESTIONS: THE CASSIUS

The overwhelming majority of suits involving claims against
foreigners during this early period were filed under the federal
courts’ admiralty jurisdiction and sought restoration of vessels that
had allegedly been captured unlawfully.76 Several suits, however,
were filed against individuals who came within the territorial
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, such as Collot and Sinclair.77 Since
foreigners who were not diplomatic representatives of a foreign
state could not claim jurisdictional immunity from suit, they instead
had to invoke the affirmative defense that a foreign government had
authorized their conduct.78 This situation vexed foreign ministers
who thought that suits against individuals acting under foreign
governmental authority should not be entertained at all in U.S.
courts.79
A lawsuit filed by Philadelphia merchant James Yard fueled
France’s diplomatic ire and illustrated the serious diplomatic
consequences of the Executive Branch’s policy of non-intervention.80
Yard sought damages resulting from the allegedly unlawful capture
of his schooner, the William Lindsay, by a French corvette (a small

74 See Keitner, supra note 54, at 73 (noting that “[t]he Executive has argued that it is
entitled to absolute deference on questions of both status-based and conduct-based immunity
based on cases involving foreign ships”).
75 Id. at 62.
76 For a detailed account of these cases, see Kevin Arlyck, The Courts and Foreign Affairs
at the Founding, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1, 27 (2017); William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal
Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
117, 117 (1993) (“[A]bundant evidence of the origins of federal admiralty jurisdiction lies
hidden in plain sight.”).
77 See supra Section II.A.
78 See supra Section II.A.
79 See supra Section II.A.
80 This litigation is described in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 719−27 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998) (referring to Yard
v. Ship Cassius, a case initiated on August 5, 1795 in the federal district court of
Pennsylvania).
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warship), the Cassius.81 When Yard learned that the Cassius had
entered the port of Philadelphia, he filed a “libel”—a legal
instrument detailing his claims and initiating a civil case in
admiralty by seeking the attachment (seizure) of the Cassius, as
well as the arrest of its captain, Samuel Davis.82 Captain Davis
happened to be both a U.S. citizen and a commissioned officer in the
French navy.83 Yard alleged that Davis had unlawfully captured the
William Lindsay and caused the ship and its cargo to be detained
wrongfully at Port au Paix, on the north coast of Haiti.84 He sought
to hold Davis legally responsible for the financial loss caused by the
resulting delay.85
French Minister Adet instructed French consul-general Joseph
Létombe to give bail for Captain Davis, and he wrote to Secretary of
State Randolph to protest the ship’s attachment and Davis’s
arrest.86 Adet argued that Davis should have been exempt from
arrest for his actions because Davis had acted on behalf of France.87
In contemporary terms, Adet argued that Davis, as an agent of
France, was entitled to jurisdictional immunity from suit based on
the official nature of his alleged conduct:
[T]he acts of a man in the character of a public agent
are not his own; he represents his Government; and if
he conducts [himself] so as to excite the complaints of
the citizens of another State, or of this State, justice
should not be required of him, but of the Government
from whom he holds the authority in virtue of which he
has done the act complained of.88
In Adet’s view, Yard could complain to France directly, or the
United States could espouse Yard’s claim against France under
international law.89 Adet believed that Yard should not be able to
Id.
Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Letter from P.A. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, to Mr.
Randolph, Sec’y of State of the U.S. (Aug. 9, 1795) [hereinafter Adet to Randolph], in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 629 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair
Clarke eds., 1833).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
81
82
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seek a remedy in U.S. court, however, because only France could
“judge whether the orders it has given [to its official] have been well
executed or not, and to approve or punish its agent, accused of an
improper act towards neutral or allied nations, and to make such
reparations as it seems just and equitable.”90 If a U.S. court were to
adjudicate the lawfulness of Davis’s actions, Adet warned, “one
Government would become amenable to another; which would
reverse the first principles of the rights of nations.”91 In other words,
in Adet’s view, the U.S. proceedings were fundamentally
incompatible with the par in parem principle.92
On August 20, 1795, Randolph—accused on shaky evidence of
having solicited a bribe from Adet’s predecessor Joseph Fauchet—
resigned as Secretary of State.93 Timothy Pickering succeeded
Randolph, first on an interim basis and then on a permanent basis.94
Before he resigned, Randolph consulted the U.S. Attorney for the
District of Pennsylvania, William Rawle, about the diplomatic crisis
triggered by the district court’s attachment of the Cassius.95 Rawle
told Pickering that he had verbally advised Randolph of his view
that a vessel belonging to a foreign sovereign nation should not be
subject to “the process of our courts,” because “[o]ne sovereign is not
amenable to the tribunals of another.”96 In this respect, Rawle’s first
reaction to hearing of the case was similar to Adet’s view. His
concern about the foreign relations implications of the lawsuit
prompted him to think creatively about possible interventions that
would not violate the constitutional separation of powers as it was
then understood.
In Rawle’s assessment, seizing the Cassius was tantamount to
allowing a suit against France itself because attaching a foreign
Id.
Id.
92 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
93 For an account sympathetic to Randolph, see Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, George
Washington and the Reputation of Edmund Randolph, 73 J. AM. HIST. 15, 15 (1986)
(“Randolph resigned as secretary of state in 1795 after his fellow cabinet members accused
him of having held improper communications with the French minister to the United States
and of having solicited a bribe from him . . . .”).
94 On Pickering’s inauspicious appointment, see GERALD H. CLARFIELD, TIMOTHY
PICKERING AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 163 (1980).
95 Statement of W. Rawle to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 21, 1796) [hereinafter Statement of
Rawle to Pickering], in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 637 (1833).
96 Id.
90
91

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

19

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 6

236

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:217

sovereign’s property “indirectly brings the sovereign to submit to
the tribunal, or to abandon the property.”97 This reasoning presaged
later arguments that a suit against a foreign sovereign’s property,
or against its officials, indirectly impleads the sovereign. Rawle
opined that there is “little difference between the direct and indirect
mode of effectuating this event, since an attachment of some
moveable article must be, in general, the mode of compelling the
appearance of a foreign sovereign.”98 He cautioned that
“[i]nconceivable evils” would result from allowing this to happen.99
He further predicted that “[a]n imprudent individual might, at
least, endeavor to detain a whole squadron by process, which it
would be fortunate, if it only exposed the judicial authority to
ridicule, and did not involve our country in hostilities.”100 In Rawle’s
assessment, the abuse of legal process could literally lead to war.
Even though the U.S. government was not a party to the
proceedings between Yard and the Cassisus, Rawle informed
Pickering that Randolph had instructed him to adopt “the speediest
method for obtaining a decision of the question.”101 Since Rawle did
not have legal authority to enter a plea in the name and on behalf
of France (which refused to appear in the proceedings), he invoked
the United States’ interest in the question and cited “authorities
where the interests of third persons had been effectually brought
before even courts of common law.”102 Based on this assertion of a
U.S. interest, he filed what he called a “suggestion” with the court,
enabling him to convey the United States’ objections to the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction in “a more solemn form of motion” without
violating the separation of powers.103
Rawle explained that he resorted to this “somewhat novel” mode
of proceeding because Adet “disclaimed the jurisdiction of the court,
Id.
Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. Rawle’s concern was not fanciful, as the British used litigation as a tactic to detain
French privateers. See, e.g., David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145, 173–74 (2008) (describing how the British filed in rem actions in
American courts to “[detain] the privateers’ property for extended periods of time and make
it difficult for privateers to initiate additional attacks”).
101 Statement of Rawle to Pickering, supra note 95, at 637.
102 Id.
103 Id. Today, suggestions of immunity and statements of interest are filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 517, which authorizes the Attorney General to send the Solicitor General, or any
officer of the Department of Justice, “to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit
pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State.”
97
98
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and called, as it appeared, with no very clear conception of the
constitutional powers of the Executive, for a direct interference to
annul the judicial proceedings.”104 France’s expectation that the
Executive Branch could and would order termination of the
proceedings created a need for U.S. officials to engage in creative
lawyering to appease France, while also respecting the foundational
separation of powers principles reflected in Bradford’s and Lee’s
denials of the authority to instruct a U.S. court to dismiss a civil
suit.105
Attorneys for Captain Davis, meanwhile, sought a writ of
prohibition from the U.S. Supreme Court to enjoin the district court
proceedings against him and the ship.106 In the Supreme Court,
Alexander Dallas argued on behalf of Davis that “[t]he Cassius,
being then the property of a sovereign and independent nation,
cannot be attached for any supposed delinquency of her commander,
committed on the high seas” because it would amount to “making
public property responsible for private wrongs.”107 He also invoked
the established principle of prize law that “the courts of the captor
have a right to decide.”108 Failure to respect this principle would
mean that “[e]very owner, freighter, master, [and] seaman[] of a
vessel taken as prize[] might sue the Captor in every Court of every
Country,” which would create “intolerable inconveniences.”109 On
August 24, 1795, Chief Justice Rutledge announced that “though a
difference of sentiment exists, a majority of the Court are clearly of
the opinion[] that the motion [to enjoin the district court
proceedings] ought to be granted.”110
The drama, however, had only just begun. Moving quickly, one of
Yard’s associates, John Ketland, filed a qui tam action—which
Statement of Rawle to Pickering, supra note 95, at 637.
As it happens, on the same day that Rawle filed his suggestion, Captain Davis’s
attorneys independently entered a plea objecting to the suit. Id. Rawle recounted that “[t]he
intention of doing this had not been communicated, or the suggestion would have been
deemed unnecessary; but, so far from interfering with, they tended to support each other.”
Id.
106 United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795).
107 Id. at 127.
108 Id. One might think of this as a type of “improper venue” argument under today’s Rule
12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
109 Id. at 128.
110 Id. at 129.
104
105
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allows private whistleblowers to initiate certain enforcement
measures—in the Philadelphia circuit court.111 Ketland asked the
court to reattach the Cassius because the vessel, previously named
les Jumeaux, had been armed in the Philadelphia port in violation
of the Neutrality Act of 1794.112 Pickering sought to fend off Adet’s
continued diplomatic protests by emphasizing that, as Randolph
had previously indicated, “as long as the question is in the hands of
our courts, the Executive cannot withdraw it from them.”113
Separation of powers principles thus made it more difficult to reach
a diplomatic solution, but they also gave the Executive Branch some
(albeit not much) diplomatic cover in refraining from taking a public
position in favor of France and against the interests of a U.S. citizen
claimant. Had the United States’ relationship with France not been
deemed so vital at this juncture, the Executive Branch might have
persisted in maintaining a more neutral posture.
As he had done previously, Rawle filed a suggestion to the circuit
court recommending that it dismiss the qui tam action.114 This time,
the suggestion included two certificates provided by Adet attesting
to the French Republic’s ownership of the Cassius.115 On June 3,
1796, Pickering reported to Adet that “the fate of the armed vessel
les Jumeaux, now called le Cassius, [was] still in suspense.”116
Counsel for Ketland objected to the certificates, arguing that they
would not be admissible to prove ownership of a ship at trial, so
“they ought not now . . . be admitted” to support “receiving a
suggestion.”117 The court continued the proceedings from May until
Ketland v. The Cassius, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 365, 14 F. Cas. 431 (C.C.D. Pa. 1796).
Id.
113 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French
Republic (Aug. 25, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 631 (1797); see
also id. at 634 (“If the Executive were to attempt (and it could only attempt—for it would be
the duty of the court to resist its mandate) to remove the question from the judiciary, it would
be a violation of the constitution: and you will see immediately that the measure would be as
unsafe as unconstitutional.”).
114 Letter from William Rawle to the Secretary of State (May 28, 1796) [hereinafter Rawle
to Secretary of State], in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 636 (1797).
115 Id. Although he filed the suggestion, Rawle confided to Pickering that he “scarcely
expect[ed], with the aid of those two certificates only, to succeed.” Id.
116 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French
Republic (June 3, 1796), in 2 STATE PAPERS RELATING TO THE DIPLOMATICK TRANSACTIONS
BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS, FROM THE YEAR 1793, TO THE
CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION, ON THE 30TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1800, at 287 (A.G. Gebhardt
ed., 1816) [hereinafter DIPLOMATICK TRANSACTIONS].
117 Letter from William Rawle to the Secretary of State (May 28, 1796), in DIPLOMATICK
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 116, at 287–88.
111
112
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its next sitting in October because it had insufficient time to hold
argument on this somewhat technical point.118 Meanwhile, the
Cassisus, which was still subject to the second writ of attachment,
literally rotted in port.119
Adet was outraged at the notion that France should be required
to prove its ownership of the Cassius by any means other than
furnishing the commission issued to Captain Davis, which
authorized him to cruise against enemy vessels.120 When the circuit
court reconvened in October, the judges heard arguments from
Rawle and from Ketland’s attorneys.121 The following morning, the
court dismissed the qui tam action on the grounds that it fell within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the district—not the circuit—court.122
By this time, the Cassius had been detained in port for over a year.
An observer later reported that “[w]hen it came out of judicial
custody, [the Cassius] was a stripped, deteriorated, and abandoned
hulk, and was sold as such by public auction.”123
The Executive Branch’s practice of disclaiming the authority to
order dismissal of a private suit remained consistent through the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, even—and perhaps
especially—in cases with potential foreign relations implications.
Nevertheless, foreign governments persisted in requesting that the
Executive Branch intervene when individuals acting on behalf of
those governments were sued in U.S. courts.124 Although civil suits
Id.
Letter from Citoyen Adet to Mr. Pickering (June 3, 1796), in DIPLOMATICK
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 116, at 289−90.
120 Id.
121 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Adet (Oct. 19, 1796), in DIPLOMATICK
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 116, at 290−91.
122 Id.
123 Henry Wheaton, WHEATON’S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 549 (Richard Henry
Dana, Jr. ed., 8th ed. 1866). Even before the conclusion of the proceedings in June 1796, Adet
ordered the ship to be dismantled and turned over to the U.S. government, accompanied by a
formal reclamation for damages. Id. at 548 (“[T]he French Government had ordered . . . the
reparation for the injuries and damages from the proceedings in the matter of [the Cassius].”).
124 See, e.g., Letter from George Hammond to Edmund Randolph (July 25, 1794), British
National Archives, F.O. 5/5 at 229 (manuscript copy on file with author), reprinted in U.S.
National Archives, Notes from the British Legation, NS 1323, M.50 Roll 1 (objecting to suit
against Captain Alexander Cochrane); Letter from [French consul-general Joseph Létombe]
to Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Relations (Nov. 29, 1797), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE OF THE
FRENCH MINISTERS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1791–1797, at 1083 (Frederick J. Turner ed.,
1903) (explaining objections raised in a suit against Létombe).
118
119

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

23

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 6

240

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:217

against individuals appear to have been much less common during
this period than in rem actions claiming ownership of ships and
their cargo, the tenor of the diplomatic correspondence they
provoked attests to their significance.
Privately initiated proceedings, brought by U.S. plaintiffs
against defendants who were physically present in the United
States, caused diplomatic consternation at best and outrage at
worst. They raised novel and difficult questions about (1) the
authority of a U.S. tribunal to inquire into the contours of a foreign
official’s lawful authority; (2) the deference owed to a foreign
government’s representation that its official had acted within the
scope of that authority; and (3) the role of the U.S. Executive
Branch, if any, in intervening in such proceedings, either in an
attempt to compel dismissal at the pleadings stage (which the
Executive Branch disclaimed any authority to do) or to provide
information and legal analysis to the court in the form of a
“suggestion.” Many of the same questions remain central to
determining the scope of jurisdictional immunity for foreign officials
today.
C. EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATIONS: DIPLOMATS AND CONSULS

As chronicled above,125 diplomatic protests sparked by civil suits
against foreign officials, and by in rem proceedings against foreign
ships, forced the Executive Branch to confront potentially thorny
separation of powers questions. Because these proceedings raised
domestic and international legal questions, successive secretaries of
state (in what was then U.S. Department of Foreign Affairs) sought
advice from successive attorneys general (in the Office of the
Attorney General, before the Department of Justice was created).126
One set of questions involved whether the Executive Branch could
direct the termination of legal proceedings against foreign officials
who were not entitled to status-based immunity because they were
not public ministers.127 Successive attorneys general answered this
question with a resounding “no.”128 Another set of questions
involved identifying which foreign officials were entitled to special
See supra Section II.B.
See John A. Fairlie, The United States Department of Justice, 3 MICH. L. REV. 352, 352
(1905).
127 See supra Section II.A.
128 See supra Section II.A.
125
126
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privileges, including status-based immunity—a question that
remains salient today.129 Not surprisingly, foreign officials often
attempted to claim this special status, and the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Office of the Attorney General had to grapple
with where to draw the line.
In an early example from 1794, Secretary of State Edmund
Randolph sought advice from Attorney General William Bradford
about a dispute involving the British consul at Norfolk, Virginia.130
The consul, John Hamilton, had complained of “a riot committed by
a number of persons tumultuously assembled” in front of his house
who, among other affronts, had allegedly “insult[ed] him with
improper language.”131 Hamilton complained that Alexander
Campbell, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Virginia, had
wrongfully declined to prosecute the demonstrators in U.S. federal
court.132 In Hamilton’s view, the rioters should have been liable to
prosecution under the Crimes Act of 1790 for the federal crime of
“infract[ing] the law of nations, by offering violence to the person of
an ambassador or other public minister.”133 Attorney General
Bradford, however, agreed with Campbell’s decision not to bring
charges because federal law did not criminalize offenses against
consuls.134 Relying on the authority of “writers on the law of
nations,” Bradford reasoned that a consul, unlike a public minister,
“is not in any degree invested with the representative character.”135
Consequently, Bradford opined that the Act “cannot reach the
offence [sic] in question, because it is now fully settled that a consul
is not a public minister.”136 Thus, Hamilton was not legally entitled

129 For recent cases involving claims to status-based immunity, see Manoharan v.
Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Tawfik v. Al-Sabah, No. 11 Civ. 6455(ALC)(JCF),
2012 WL 3542209, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012); Smith v. Ghana Commercial Bank, Ltd.,
No. 10-4655 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 2930462, at *9 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012).
130 William Bradford, Respect Due to Consuls, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 41 (1794).
131 Id. at 41–42.
132 Id. at 42.
133 Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat.
112 (1790).
134 See id.; see also William Bradford, Respect Due to Consuls, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 41, 42–43
(1794).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 42.
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to the protections he claimed under either international or domestic
law.137
Unlike consuls, who do not represent their countries in the
conduct of foreign relations, ambassadors and public ministers with
diplomatic functions are accorded special treatment under the law
of nations and under U.S. law. The Crimes Act of 1790 protected
foreign ambassadors and public ministers, but not consuls, by
making assaults on them a federal crime.138 U.S. and international
law also shielded foreign ambassadors and public ministers from
being subjected to legal proceedings in U.S. courts by according
them ratione personae, or status-based, immunity from
jurisdiction.139 As Attorney General Charles Lee explained in a 1797
opinion, “an ambassador is not liable in any case, according to the
law of nations, to answer either criminally or civilly before any court
of the foreign nation to which he is sent.”140 Lee noted that § 25 of
the Crimes Act was “[c]onformable to this principle,” as it rendered
void any process issuing from a U.S. state or federal court against
“the person of any ambassador or other public minister of any
foreign prince or state.”141 Moreover, like the analogous English
statute, § 26 of the Act rendered any persons who “sue[d] forth or
prosecuted any such writ or process,” their attorneys, and any
officers who executed such a writ or process liable to a fine and up
to three years’ imprisonment as “violaters [sic] of the laws of
nations, and disturbers of the public repose.”142 Under this

137 For historical background on diplomatic and consular immunities, see, for example,
LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (1999) (analyzing
the practice of diplomatic immunity from ancient times to the present); JULIUS I. PUENTE,
THE FOREIGN CONSUL: HIS JURIDICAL STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES (1926) (chronicling U.S.
practice with regard to consular, as opposed to diplomatic, immunity); ELLERY C. STOWELL,
CONSULAR CASES AND OPINIONS: FROM THE DECISIONS OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
COURTS AND THE OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1909) (collecting and reprinting
cases on consular immunity).
138 Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat.
112 (1790).
139 See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 54, at 131 (indicating that “[t]he consul is no public
minister . . . and cannot pretend to the privileges appertaining to such character”).
140 Charles Lee, Libellous Publications, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 71, 74 (1797).
141 Id.; Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 25, 1
Stat. 112 (1790).
142 Section 25 of the Crimes Act specified that the ambassador must have been “authorized
and received as such by the President of the United States” and that the ambassador’s
immunity extended to “any domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or other
public minister” and to “his or their goods or chattels.” Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). Cf. William Wirt, Foreign
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framework, an ambassador or public minister recognized as such by
the U.S. government would not have to plead jurisdictional
immunity from suit, because any process issued from a U.S. state or
federal court would be considered “null and void” from the outset.
The Executive Branch’s role, if any, was to certify to the court that
the defendant possessed the requisite status, if there was a dispute
on this point.
The distinction between foreign officials who were “invested with
the representative character” and other individuals acting on behalf
of foreign states was crucial in drawing the line between those
exempt from U.S. legal process and those subject to it.143 As
indicated in Section II.A above, successive attorneys general
confirmed that those who did not qualify as public ministers were
“with respect to [their] suability . . . on a footing with every other
foreigner . . . who comes within the jurisdiction of our courts.”144
Because they were not shielded from U.S. legal proceedings by
virtue of their official positions, these individuals were left to defend
their conduct on the merits. One of the defenses available to them,
however, was that they did not bear personal responsibility for any
damages caused by their actions taken within the scope of the
powers lawfully conferred on them by a foreign government.145
Other cases that arose during this period also turned on the
difference between the status-based immunity accorded diplomats
Ministers, & Consuls, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 406, 408 (1820) (asserting consuls are not within the
function areas protected by the act).
143 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
144 William Bradford, Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45 (1794); see also Charles
Lee, Actions Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797) (“[A] person acting under a
commission from the sovereign of a foreign nation is not amenable . . . to any judiciary
tribunal in the United States.”); William Bradford, Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen.
49 (1794) (being of the “opinion that it does not appear from this state of facts that the
defendant has any legal claim to be privileged from arrest”).
145 This defense appears to have carried particular weight in the commercial context. See,
e.g., Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172, 178 (1818) (citing Jones v. Létombe, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 384 (1798), for the proposition that “all the authorities show that an agent
contracting on the behalf of government is not personally liable”); see also Greenspan v.
Crosbie, No. 74 Civ. 4734 (GLG), 1976 WL 841, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1976) (finding
individual officials immune for a state’s commercial transactions). The same appears to have
been true for “claims sounding in contract” brought against domestic officials because “the
liability did not run against the officer as such but against the government.” James E. Pfander
& Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1871 n.37 (2010).
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under the law of nations and U.S. law, and the defense of official
capacity—and corresponding lack of personal liability—that other
foreign officials could attempt to invoke on the merits at trial.146
These cases are significant because they underscore the extent to
which early understandings of jurisdictional immunity based on
status were treated as conceptually and doctrinally distinct from
the merits question of whether or not a defendant who had acted on
behalf of a foreign state, and who was not entitled to status-based
immunity, could be held liable for her actions in a U.S. court. Today,
we understand such claims to rest on a principle of ratione materiae
or conduct-based immunity from jurisdiction, not simply freedom
from liability on the merits. This different understanding carries
implications for pleading standards, burdens of proof, and the
respective roles of the judicial and executive branches.
A suit brought against Louis André Pichon, the French chargé
d’affaires, further illustrates the point and helps to fill in the
historical record of notable cases against consuls. It also sheds light
on the difficulty of making factual determinations at the pleadings
stage, when the plaintiff’s claims are generally treated as true.147
Pichon was sued in 1805 for payment on bills of exchange that he
had signed in the course of equipping French frigates in New
York.148 Pichon claimed that his position as chargé d’affaires
entitled him to status-based immunity and thus compelled
immediate discharge of the process against him.149 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that the position of chargé
d’affaires would entitle its holder to diplomatic immunity because
of its representative function.150 But the question remained: how
could Pichon prove that he held this status? Although Pichon
argued that “the notoriety of his reception by the President” was
sufficient to prove his official position, the claimant insisted that

146 See Keitner, supra note 1, at 749–57 (discussing the nineteenth-century line of cases
involving claims of foreign official immunity).
147 For a discussion of contemporary standards, see generally A. Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008).
148 Dupont v. Pichon, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 321 (Pa. 1805). Pichon reportedly borrowed “freely”
from DuPont, which proved problematic when DuPont presented bills signed by Pichon for
payment. See Bessie Gardner Du Pont, E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, A HISTORY,
1802−1902, at 27−28 (1920).
149 Dupont, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 322.
150 Id. at 324.
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“proof should be produced from the secretary of state of [Pichon’s]
reception as a minister.”151
The task of determining Pichon’s status was complicated by the
fact that a new French Minister, General Louis-Marie Turreau, had
arrived in the United States several months earlier.152 Although
Pennsylvania Chief Justice Edward Shippen “seemed inclined to
wait for information, from the department of state, as to [Pichon’s]
actual reception by the president in that character [of minister],”
the court ultimately agreed to discharge Pichon absolutely from the
process in order to spare him from being imprisoned as a defendant
in a civil suit until such proof could be obtained—a delay that
Pichon’s attorneys had warned “would attract the serious attention
of every foreign minister and government.”153 The anticipated
foreign relations repercussions of Pichon’s potential detention were
not lost on the Pennsylvania judges and appear to have played a
role in their decision.
The question of whether consuls could claim entitlement to
status-based immunity, which was later addressed by treaty, also
arose during this period, notwithstanding the exclusion of consuls
from the provisions of the Crimes Act.154 In an especially colorful
example, President George Washington accredited Joseph Ravara
as consul general of the Doge and Governors of the Republic of
Genoa in Philadelphia in 1791.155 Less than two years later, Ravara
authored anonymous letters to Washington and other public figures
in an attempt at extortion, leading to his indictment for a

Id. at 323–24.
42 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 416 (James P. McClure ed., 2016) (indicating
that Louis Marie Turreau de Garambouville was named the new French minister
plenipotentiary to the United States in December 1803 but did not arrive in Washington until
November 1804).
153 Dupont, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 323–24.
154 See generally Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (providing personal inviolability for
the consular); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C.
§ 254(a)–(e) (2006); see also supra note 138 and accompanying text.
155 For more about this saga, see the annotated letter to George Washington from Joseph
Ravara (May 10, 1793), 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 563–
65 (Christine Sternberg Patrick & John C. Pinheiro eds., 2005).
151
152
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misdemeanor.156 Alexander Dallas argued on behalf of Ravara that
“considering the official character of the defendant, such a
proceeding ought not to be sustained, nor such a punishment
inflicted.”157 William Rawle countered on behalf of the United States
that “the consular character of the defendant gave jurisdiction to
the circuit court, and did not entitle him to an exemption from
prosecution agreeably to the law of nations.”158 The circuit court
agreed that Ravara’s consular appointment did not confer
status-based immunity from prosecution.159
Similarly, in December 1820, Attorney General William Wirt was
asked to opine on whether the Spanish vice-consul at New Orleans,
Josef Nicolás de Villavazo, was entitled to immunity from suit in a
U.S. court.160 Luis Seré, owner of the corvette Cora, sued Villavazo
for allegedly providing information that caused the ship to be
detained at Campeche on the Gulf of Mexico by the Captain General
(governor) of Yucatán.161 The Spanish Minister to the United States,
General Francisco Dionisio Vivés, called on the President “to
suspend the proceedings in this case” because Villavazo, “being a
public functionary of his Catholic Majesty, is protected from arrest
by the law of nations . . . and can be made to answer for this alleged
injury only to the sovereign from whom he derives his
commission.”162 Wirt responded that “the subject being a civil
individual suit, of which the judiciary has possession, the President
has no authority to interpose in the case” and that the vice-consul,
who was neither an ambassador nor a public minister received as
156 See United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794) [hereinafter Ravara II];
United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) [hereinafter Ravara I]; cf. The
Washington-Madison Papers: Catalogue Compiled and Sale Conducted by Stan. V. Henkels
(1892) (identifying Item 478 as “[t]he anonymous letters sent to General Washington by
Joseph Ravara, Consul from Genoa, for the purpose of extorting money” and describing “the
spelling, bad” and “the writing in script and block-letter”).
157 Ravara II, 27 F. Cas. at 714; Ravara I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 297.
158 Ravara II, 27 F. Cas. at 714.
159 Id. at 715.
160 William Wirt, Foreign Ministers, Consuls, & c., 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 406 (1820).
161 Id.; see also Letter from Hilario de Rivas y Salmon to Secretary of State Henry Clay
(Mar. 31, 1826) in DNA, RG59, 8 NOTES FROM SPANISH LEGATION (M59, R11) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Hilario de Rivas y Salmon to Secretary of State Henry Clay] (referring
to a letter from Vives to John Quincy Adams that argued that “in no case could an agent of
His Majesty, acknowledged by the President, be responsible to the American authorities for
his official acts” and that reported that Villavazo “is at present unwell, and without means
wherewith to satisfy the amount of the fine to which he has been condemned, and on the eve
of being dragged to a public prison for it”).
162 Hilario de Rivas y Salmon to Secretary of State Henry Clay, supra note 161.
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such by the President, could not seek to nullify the suit on the
grounds of status-based immunity.163 After canvassing multiple
authorities on the law of nations, Wirt concluded that “there is no
author of general notoriety in this country, who maintains the
exemption of the consul from . . . [civil] jurisdiction; and no one, who
descends to the particular question at all, that does not, on the
contrary, admit it.”164 In this regard, Wirt averred that consuls
present in the United States “are on the same footing here as in
other countries.”165 Accordingly, the President could not—and
would not—“suspend the proceedings” in response to the Spanish
Minister’s request.166
In this manner, successive U.S. attorneys general fended off
pressure from foreign states to intervene in civil proceedings
initiated against foreign consuls in U.S. courts. They emphasized
that domestic constitutional law forbade intervention and that
international law permitted the exercise of domestic jurisdiction
over consuls in the absence of status-based immunity. The core
practical problem with this approach was that the substantive
defense of lack of personal responsibility took time to adjudicate.
Some courts convened infrequently, and hearings could be
scheduled months apart.167 In the meantime, foreign defendants
arrested in civil suits had to post bail to secure their release and
could not leave the United States until the claims against them
were dismissed or resolved in their favor.168
In the context of private litigation (as opposed to criminal
prosecutions initiated by the U.S. government), the lack of a
“gatekeeping” function gave the Executive Branch a basis to decline
foreign requests to intervene. At the same time, however, it
deprived the Executive of an expedient way to secure the dismissal
of cases that, in its view, interfered with the conduct of foreign
relations. Allowing suits against foreign defendants—in
contemporary terms, by recognizing a cause of action and treating
163 William Wirt, Foreign Ministers, & Consuls, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 406 (1820). He did,
however, concede that Villavazo could be sued only in federal court, not in state court. Id.
164 Id. at 410.
165 Id. at 413.
166 Id. at 406.
167 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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service of process as a valid means of bringing the defendant within
the court’s personal jurisdiction—created pressure for immunity
doctrines to provide a “safety valve” for suits with potentially
negative foreign relations consequences. Without settled abstention
doctrines, judges had to navigate questions of jurisdiction and
justiciability based on their understandings of common-law and
law-of-nations restrictions on the scope of their judicial power. This
pushed such questions toward resolution as a matter of law by the
courts, rather than diplomacy by the Executive Branch,
notwithstanding the high diplomatic stakes involved in certain
high-profile cases, as detailed in Section II.D.
D. EXECUTIVE PREDICAMENTS: THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE AND
SPANISH CARGO

If the Cassius debacle had put private litigation on a collision
course with the conduct of foreign relations, an ownership dispute
involving the schooner Exchange threatened to alienate France just
as the United States was on the brink of war with Great Britain.169
It also provided an occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to articulate
limits on the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign ships in U.S.
ports, which it had earlier expanded in the prize context.170
Executive Branch lawyers argued strenuously—and successfully—
for this result, even though it left two U.S. shipowners
empty-handed.
1. An Analysis of The Schooner Exchange.
In July 1811, during the height of the Napoleonic Wars, a public
ship of war in the service of French Emperor Napoleon I came into
the port of Philadelphia for refreshment and repairs.171 It was
commanded by Captain Dennis M. Begon and named the Balaou
No. 5.172 Upon learning of the ship’s presence, Maryland residents
John McFaddon and William Greetham filed a libel against the ship
to prevent it from departing.173 The libel claimed that the vessel,

169 See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), reversing
McFaddon v. The Exchange, 16 F. Cas. 85 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811).
170 See Glass v. The Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794); see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra
note 23, at 1025–27.
171 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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which they called the Exchange, rightfully belonged to them.174
According to their account, the Exchange had set sail from
Baltimore on October 27, 1809 en route to St. Sebastian in Spain.175
The following year, it allegedly had been captured unlawfully by
persons acting under the “decrees and orders” of Napoleon.176
McFaddon and Greetham sought to have the ship restored to them
by an order of the court.177 On August 24, as the ship was about to
leave the port, it was seized and arrested pursuant to the libel.178
The French Minister to the United States, Louis Sérurier,
petitioned Secretary of State James Monroe to intervene and have
the ship released immediately based on the “universally recognized
principle” that courts lack jurisdiction over private claims against a
foreign sovereign.179 Meanwhile, Sérurier instructed the French
Vice Consul in Philadelphia, Honoré Felix de Douzy, to protest the
court’s action without entering an appearance, so that he would not
be deemed to have accepted the court’s jurisdiction.180 The trial
judge, who apparently had been treating the case like an ordinary
property dispute, was reportedly disconcerted by this protest.181 To
Id.
Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 118.
179 See Letter from Louis Sérurier, French Minister to the United States, to
Hugues-Barnard Maret, Duc de Bassano (Oct. 9, 1811) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Sérurier to Maret] (“[L]e principle universellement reconnu de l’incompétence des tribunaux
pour connaître des reclamations de particulier à souverain, de toute juridiction étrangère.”
[“[T]he universally recognized principle of the incompetence of courts to know the claims
[unique to the sovereign] of all foreign jurisdictions.”]). In a letter from November 3, 1811,
Sérurier wrote to Monroe citing his previous letter of October 3, 1811, “relating to the
violation of the law of nations that took place with respect to the Balaou of His Imperial
Majesty Nov. 5 by the Pennsylvania authorities,” and indicated that the continued arrest of
the Balaou despite the Philadelphia Vice-Consul’s protest and Sérurier’s own demarche to
the U.S. government showed a disregard for the dignity of the sovereign and for accepted
general principles of law (“droit commun des nations”). Letter from Louis Sérurier, French
Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State, U.S. (Nov. 3, 1811) (on
file with author).
180 See Sérurier to Maret, supra note 179.
181 Id. A letter partially reprinted in the Alexandria Daily Gazette on September 7, 1811
and originally sent to the editors of the Baltimore Federal Republican on August 30
recounted: “The Frenchmen employed no lawyer to appear for them, but soon after the
business commenced, the French consul handed the judge a paper, in form of a protest,
against the libellants and the court, saying, THAT IF THEY CONDEMNED THE
SCHOONER, HIS MASTER WOULD LOOK TO THEM [THE COURT] FOR
174
175
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Sérurier’s consternation, Monroe responded that courts in America
were beyond the power of the government to control but that he
would write to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Philadelphia to
inform him of the Executive Branch’s opinion on the matter.182
Sérurier complained to the French Foreign Minister that the
independence of U.S. courts gave the Executive Branch an
“admirable excuse for not rectifying grievances that it does not want
to remedy, or fully to acknowledge.”183
The continued detention of the Balaou No. 5 risked further
provoking France’s ire at a time when the United States found itself
inching towards war with Great Britain.184 Prompted by Monroe,
Alexander Dallas, who had been appointed U.S. Attorney for the
District of Pennsylvania in 1801, followed William Rawle’s example
in the Cassius case and filed a suggestion in the district court,
arguing that applicable law did not permit the attachment of a
French ship of war in response to a private suit.185 Over the

INDEMNIFICATION.” Letter from Philadelphia to the Editors of the Baltimore Federal
Republican (Aug. 30, 1811), in ALEXANDRIA DAILY GAZETTE, Sept. 7, 1811. The letter
indicated that district Judge Richard Peters treated the protest “with becoming indignation,
as an insult to the court, and said, that he had never seen or heard of any thing [sic] like it
since the days of [Citizen] Genet.” Id. Peters handed the paper to Dallas and told him “he
might do with it what he pleased; but it should not go on the files of the court.” Id. The letter
concluded by surmising that “the paper will be handed to the President at Washington, and
then we shall see how far French influence will go.” Id. Indeed, Secretary Monroe reported to
President James Madison that he had “received a statement from Mr[.] Dallas of the conduct
of the French consul” in the case. Letter from James Monroe, Secretary of State, to James
Madison, President (Sept. 7, 1811), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-0302-0533.
182 Sérurier to Maret, supra note 179 (“[L]es tribunaux, en Amérique, étaient places hors
du contrôle du Governement.” [“[T]he courts, in America, were placed outside the control of
the government.”]).
183 Id. (“[C]ette independence des tribunaux qui gêne souvent le gouvernement, lui sert
aussi quelquefois d’admirable excuse pour ne pas redresser des griefs qu’il ne veut ni réparer,
ni avouer tout à fait.” [“[T]his independence of courts, that often [bothers] the government,
serves it also as an admirable excuse not to rectify the grievances that it does not want to
[sort out], nor admit at all.”]).
184 See, e.g., J.C.A. Stagg, James Madison and the “Malcontents”: The Political Origins of
the War of 1812, 4 WM. & MARY Q. 557, 583 (1976) (indicating that “[d]iplomatically and
politically, . . . Madison was in an intolerable position in the summer of 1811”).
185 As described in the Alexandria Daily Gazette on March 7, 1812, the suggestion had
indicated that
inasmuch as there exists between the United States of America and
Napoleon, Emperor of France and King of Italy, . . . a state of peace and
amity; the public vessels of his said Imperial and Royal Majesty, conforming
to the laws of nations, and laws of the said United States, may freely enter
the ports and harbors of the said United States, and at pleasure depart
therefrom without seizure, arrest, detention or molestation.
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claimants’ objections, the court ultimately agreed that it could not
exercise jurisdiction over a French ship of war that was “actually
employed” in the service of Napoleon.186
The matter did not end there. On appeal, the circuit court
reversed the district court’s decision to release the ship.187 Supreme
Court Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as a justice of the circuit
court, found that there was no applicable exception to the court’s
plenary territorial jurisdiction over a ship in port.188 Washington
accepted Dallas’s “suggestion”—which was still a relatively novel
form of pleading—as a permissible method for conveying
information to the court “upon subjects which concern the peace of
the nation, or which the executive deems essential for the public
good.”189 He noted that, because France had declined to appear,
Dallas had also proffered Captain Begon’s commission from
Napoleon as evidence of Begon’s authority to capture ships.190 He
commended both sides for having presented their legal arguments
“with great ability.”191 However, without “a solid ground for
excluding the present case” from the “general rule” of plenary
jurisdiction over persons and objects within U.S. territory,
Washington declined to invent one—while at the same time

Supreme Court of the U. States: Case of the Schooner Exchange, ALEXANDRIA DAILY GAZETTE,
Mar. 7, 1812. By contrast, in 1799, Attorney General Lee had advised that
[t]he officers and crew of a public ship-of-war, being admitted into the United
States, are entitled to be treated with hospitality and kindness; but this does
not, in reason, require that the ship should be exempt from judicial process;
and more especially when they are bound by every kind of obligation to act
in conformity to the laws of the country which affords them and their ship
its sovereign protection while within its jurisdiction.
Charles Lee, Service of Process on a British Ship-of-War, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 87, 89 (1799).
186 See McFaddon v. The Exchange, 16 F. Cas. 85 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (reversing the district
court’s decision), rev’d The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
187 Id. Sérurier harbored suspicions that the British had encouraged McFaddon and
Greetham to file an appeal and complained that the circuit court was known to be hostile to
France. See Letter from Louis Sérurier, French Minister to the United States, to
Hugues-Barnard Maret, Duc de Bassano (Nov. 16, 1811) [hereinafter Sérurier to Maret] (on
file with author).
188 The Exchange, 16 F. Cas. at 86, 88 (“I am at a loss for a solid ground for excluding the
present case from the jurisdiction of the district court.”).
189 Id. at 86.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 87.
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expressing some relief that, if his judgment proved wrong, his
colleagues on the Supreme Court would correct it.192
Upon learning of the circuit court’s decision, Sérurier went
straight to Secretary Monroe’s office and announced that he now
had proof that, as far as Pennsylvania was concerned, there was no
international law.193 A long discussion ensued during which Monroe
attempted to explain principles of federalism, separation of powers,
and appellate review to the irate ambassador.194 In Sérurier’s view,
the Executive was charged with the conduct of foreign relations, and
it was therefore the Executive’s responsibility to ensure the United
States’ observance of international law, including foreign sovereign
immunity.195
Although the Executive Branch remained unable and unwilling
to compel a particular judicial result, Attorney General William
Pinkney requested that the Supreme Court expedite oral argument,
and the Court granted his request.196 Dallas, together with Pinkney,
argued that the Balaou No. 5 was entitled to the same status-based
immunity from U.S. jurisdiction owed a foreign ambassador or head
of state on the grounds that—as Rawle had argued years earlier in
the Cassius case—“[t]he arrest of the thing is to obtain jurisdiction
over the person” of the foreign sovereign.197 Dallas warned the Court
that exercising jurisdiction over the ship would “amount to a judicial
declaration of war” against France.198 Counsel for McFaddon and
Greetham countered that Dallas and Pinkney bore the burden of
proving an exception to the general rule of territorial jurisdiction
over ships in U.S. ports.199 Any other approach, they cautioned,
Id.
Sérurier to Maret, supra note 187 (“Je lui dis que je venais d’acquérir la preuve qu’il n’y
avait pas de droit des gens pour la Pennsylvanie.” [“I told him that I just acquired the evidence
that there was no international law for Pennsylvania.”]).
194 Id.
195 Id. (explaining to Monroe that “je ne connais que le Gouvernement; que c’était à lui qui
étaient confiés les relations avec les nations étrangères, et le soin de faire observer à leur
égard les loix de l’hospitalité et des droit des gens” [“I only know the government; that it was
to it [the government] that were entrusted relations with foreign nations, and the care to
make them observe laws of hospitality and international law”]).
196 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
197 Id. at 133. Although Dallas was not part of the Office of the Attorney General, Pinkney
asked President James Madison to instruct Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin to employ
Dallas “to assist in the Cases in the supreme Court of the US in which it was thought his Aid
would be advisable.” See Letter from William Pinkney to James Madison (Jan. 22, 1812),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-04-02-0161.
198 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 126.
199 Id. at 127–28.
192
193
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would neglect the wrongs inflicted on U.S. citizens and give “a
sanction to their spoliators.”200 It was not lost on the claimants—
and they emphasized to the Court—that the United States was
taking a position favorable to France and against the interests of
injured U.S. citizens.
Pinkney argued in response that any claims relating to the ship
should be resolved between the governments of France and the
United States rather than through private litigation.201 He invoked
the fiction of “exterritoriality”—the idea that certain foreign
officials should be treated, as a legal matter, as if they were located
outside the forum’s territory—to support an exception to the general
rule of territorial sovereignty.202 Under this fiction, a foreign
sovereign “is supposed to be out of the country, although he may
happen to be within it.”203 The same was true, Pinkney argued, of
the Balaou No. 5.204
The Supreme Court found Dallas’s and Pinkney’s reasoning
persuasive. Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion for a
unanimous court within less than a week, apparently did not share
his colleague Justice Washington’s inhibitions about crafting new
doctrine. He acknowledged that the Court was “exploring an
unbeaten path, with few, if any, aids from precedents or written
law.”205 Nevertheless, he situated this case within a “class of cases
in which every sovereign is understood to wave [sic] the exercise of
a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has
been stated to be the attribute of every nation.”206 These cases
include the personal (status-based) immunities of ambassadors and
heads of state, as well as guarantees of safe passage given to foreign
troops by the general or specific consent of the territorial
sovereign.207 By analogy, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the
Balaou No. 5 had entered the port of Philadelphia with the implied
Id. at 128.
Id. at 132 (stating that “[w]hen wrongs are inflicted by one nation upon another . . . [t]he
right to demand redress belongs to the executive department, which alone represents the
sovereignty of the nation in its intercourse with other nations”).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 136.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 137–39.
200
201
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assent of the United States that it would be able to depart freely.
While Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the territorial
sovereign retains the power to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
public vessels “either by employing force or by subjecting such
vessels to the ordinary tribunals,” the territorial sovereign’s intent
to subject such vessels to jurisdiction should not be presumed “until
such power be exerted in such a manner not to be misunderstood.”208
In other words, the presumption should be that foreign public
vessels are exempt from the host country’s jurisdiction, rather than
vice versa.
Chief Justice Marshall’s approach turned on its head the legal
opinion offered a decade earlier by Attorney General Lee, who had
advised that “the judicial power of a nation extends to every person
and every thing [sic] in its territory, excepting only such foreigners
as enjoy the right of extraterritoriality” (which Chief Justice
Marshall would have agreed with), and that “[i]f an exemption from
this rule is claimed by a foreign ship-of-war, it is incumbent on such
ship to set forth and maintain clearly and satisfactorily its right to
the exemption, or it must be deemed within the general rule” (a
burden that Chief Justice Marshall reversed).209 Although Dallas
and Pinkney persuaded the Supreme Court that the Exchange was
entitled to immunity from U.S. jurisdiction under applicable law,
they did not argue that the Executive Branch could order the court
to relinquish jurisdiction, which would have gone a step further.210
While the litigation was pending, Secretary of State James
Monroe wrote to the U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary to France, Joel
Barlow.211 Monroe indicated that he had been corresponding with
French Minister Sérurier about the case.212 He stated that the
United States was conducting the “whole process in favor of the
Id. at 146.
Charles Lee, Service of Process on a British Ship-of-War, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 87, 88–89
(1799).
210 See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 132–34, 147 (arguing successfully that the vessel
should be granted “immunity from the ordinary jurisdiction, as extensive as that of an
ambassador, or of the Sovereign himself;—but no further”).
211 See Letter from Secretary of State James Monroe to Joel Barlow, U.S. Minister
Plenipotentiary to France (Nov. 21, 1811) [hereinafter Monroe to Barlow] (concerning the
seizure of the vessel Balaou), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 513 (Walter
Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1815).
212 Monroe to Barlow, supra note 211, at 515; see also Letter from James Monroe to James
Madison (Sept. 7, 1811), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-03-02-0533
(enclosing a draft response to a complaint about the Balaou’s seizure received from French
Minister Louis-Barbé-Charles Sérurier).
208
209
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French Government” at its own expense, but that it was not
becoming an actual party to the litigation.213 The United States was
proceeding in this indirect fashion, he explained, because for the
President to take the vessel away from the court and from its U.S.
owners “even if under any circumstances lawful, would have excited
universal discontent.”214 Monroe was mindful of the political, as well
as legal, constraints on the Executive Branch’s ability to use the
tools at its disposal to bring about a desired outcome—namely, the
return of the ship to the French consul.215
Despite the United States’ willingness to defend France’s
interests in court, Monroe emphasized to the French ambassador
that the United States viewed France’s seizure of the Exchange as
unlawful and would seek an indemnity from France for its loss.216
He also expressed doubt about whether the Balaou No. 5 really had
been in distress when it entered the Philadelphia port for repairs,
noting that “[s]he having on board a cargo, distress may have been
a pretext.”217 Secretary Monroe, a lawyer, further confided to U.S.
Ambassador Barlow that “it is painful to see a question connected
with the public law originate under such circumstances.”218 Indeed,
although the Supreme Court’s decision succeeded in averting the
diplomatic crisis at hand, Chief Justice Marshall’s creative opinion
also became—for better or for worse—the standard reference for the
U.S. law of foreign sovereign immunity.219

Monroe to Barlow, supra note 211, at 515.
Id.
215 Sérurier to Maret, supra note 187 (recounting Monroe’s concern that a heavy-handed
reaction by the Executive Branch contrary to the interests of American citizens would be
perceived by the public as “an act of excessive partiality towards France”).
216 See Monroe to Barlow, supra note 211, at 515. This is an interesting contrast to Dallas’s
suggestion, which did not take a position on the lawfulness of the alleged seizure. See
ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, March 7, 1812.
217 Monroe to Barlow, supra note 211, at 515.
218 Id.
219 Sérurier had taken some comfort in the precedential value of a judgment in France’s
favor, although he had hoped that the district court’s judgment would be the final word on
the matter. See Sérurier to Maret, supra note 179 (“Je compte que, au moins, ce judgement
servira de règle pour les cas semblables qui pourraient se représenter.” [“I [reckon] that, at
least, this judgment will serve as a rule for similar cases [that could appear.]]”).
213
214
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2. An Analysis of The Santissima Trinidad.
The Schooner Exchange was not the only significant case Chief
Justice Marshall adjudicated involving claims to jurisdictional
immunity by a foreign ship. Five years later, he again considered
arguments that a foreign public ship was exempt from U.S.
jurisdiction in a case that arose while he was riding circuit and
sitting as an appeals court judge in Virginia.220 Although The
Schooner Exchange is more famous, the story of the Santissima
Trinidad illustrates powerfully the push-and-pull between legal
process and diplomatic pressure in virtually every case involving
jurisdictional immunities. Justice Joseph Story, who had joined
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange,
authored the Supreme Court’s eventual decision in the case, which
introduced the idea of “comity” as a basis for according jurisdictional
immunities to foreign ships.221 To this day, Justice Story’s framing
has contributed to a view of foreign sovereign immunity under U.S.
law as a matter of “grace” or discretion, rather than legal
obligation.222
In March 1817, the South American vessel Independencia del
Sud (Independencia) came into the port of Norfolk, Virginia seeking
repairs.223 Its cargo was placed in a U.S. custom-house for
safekeeping.224 In April, Spanish consul Antonio Argote Villalobos
filed a libel in the district court of Norfolk claiming that the
Independencia and another ship had unlawfully captured cargo
from the Santissima Trinidad and the St. Ander, two Spanish
ships.225 Villalobos’s successor, Pablo Chacon, ultimately persuaded
the court to order the seized property restored to Spain.226 The
Independencia’s captain appealed, arguing that the cargo was
exempt from the jurisdiction of a U.S. court.227
The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822).
Id. See also William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071, 2091 (2015) (“Justice Story, who joined the opinion in The Schooner Exchange,
would write just a decade later that the doctrine expounded in that case ‘stands upon
principles of public comity and convenience.’” (citing Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.)
at 353)).
222 See Dodge, supra note 221, at 2091 (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently
characterized foreign sovereign immunity as ‘a matter of grace and comity on the part of the
United States.’” (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983))).
223 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 288.
224 Id. at 286.
225 Id. at 284–85.
226 Id. at 290.
227 See Chacon v. Eighty-Nine Bales of Cochineal, 5 F. Cas. 390, 391 (C.C.D. Va. 1821).
220
221
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This dispute about the ownership of cargo involved a much larger
political picture. Just as France and Great Britain had used
litigation as a means of waging maritime war in the 1790s, Spain
similarly resorted to judicial process to pursue its foreign policy
agenda. The litigation surrounding the Santissima Trinidad
unfolded against the backdrop of Spain’s continued objection to the
arming in U.S. ports of privateers who then cruised against, and
captured, Spanish ships during the Spanish-American Wars of
Independence.228 Spanish Minister Luis de Onís complained
vociferously to Secretary of State Monroe in January 1817 about
[t]he mischiefs resulting from the toleration of the
armament of privateers in the ports of this Union, and
of bringing into them, with impunity, the plunder made
by these privateers on the Spanish trade, for the
purpose of distributing it among those merchants who
have no scruple in engaging in these piracies.229
In his view, the United States should have repressed and punished
privateering, rather than tolerate it.230
When John Quincy Adams was appointed Secretary of State, he
sought to defend U.S. practices to Onís.231 At the same time,
however, he took the proactive step of instructing U.S.
representatives to the South American provinces to “remonstrate to
them” about the practice of fitting out privateers in U.S. ports and
to convey “that the licentious abuse of their flags by these
freebooters, of every nation but their own, has an influence
unpropitious to the cause of their freedom, and tendency to deter

228 See Letter from Don Luis de Onís to the Secretary of State (Jan. 2, 1817) [hereinafter
Luis de Onís to the Secretary of State] (documenting Spanish Minister Don Luis de Onís’s
complaint as to America’s lack of oversight over privateers arming themselves in U.S. ports),
in ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 2 at 1899−1900 (1818).
229 Id.
230 Id. at 1901.
231 See John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Caesar A. Rodney, John Graham, and
Theoderick Bland, Special Commissioners of the United States to South America (Nov. 21,
1817), quoted in Samual Flagg Bemis, Early Diplomatic Missions from Buenos Aires to the
United States 1811−1824, 49 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY 11, 48
n.1 (1939).
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other countries from recognizing them as regular Governments.”232
He emphasized that if these provinces wanted to join the
community of nations, they had to play by certain rules.
The Independencia was a case in point, since it sailed under a
commission from the revolutionary government in Buenos Aires.233
The Collector of Norfolk, Charles K. Mallory, who was responsible
for collecting import duties on foreign goods that entered the United
States by ship, observed that available documentation indicated
that the Independencia was “a public armed vessel, not a privateer,
and commenced her cruise from Buenos Ayres [sic] under the orders
of that Government (be it whatever you may please to term it) in
May, 1816.”234 Based on this documentation, he treated the
Independencia as a public armed vessel entitled to the same
courtesies he would have extended to any public vessel of a friendly
foreign state.235 This explanation did not appease Spanish consul
Villalobos, who objected that “these violators of all law pretend to
shield their conduct under a commission from a Government the
existence of which is not acknowledged by this or any other civilized
country.”236 In his view, and that of Spanish Minister Onís, the
Independencia was no better than a pirate ship, and should have
been treated as such.237
The Independencia’s captain, James Chaytor, insisted that he
had seized cargo from the Spanish ships under the authority of a
commission from the government of Buenos Aires and that the
captured property had been duly condemned as a prize by a tribunal
of the United Provinces (which had declared its independence on
July 9, 1816) at Buenos Aires.238 The dispute over the cargo risked

Id.
Letter from Charles K. Mallory to Antonio A. Villalobos (Apr. 14, 1817), in ANNALS OF
CONGRESS, supra note 228, at 1927.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Letter from Antonio A. Villalobos to Charles K. Mallory, Collector of Norfolk and
Portsmouth (Apr. 10, 1817), in ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 228, at 1922.
237 When the Independencia arrived in the port of Norfolk, Spanish Minister Onís wrote to
then-Acting Secretary of State Richard Rush to complain that when its captain, the
“well-known pirate, called Commodore Chaytor,” saluted the U.S. fort at Norfolk, “it returned
the salute upon the same terms as would have been done with a vessel of war of my Sovereign,
or of any other nation acknowledged by all independent Powers.” Letter from Don Luis de
Onís to the Secretary of State (Mar. 26, 1817), in ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 228, at
1912.
238 Chacon v. Eighty-Nine Vales of Cochineal, 5 F. Cas. 390, 391 (C.C.D. Va. 1821).
232
233
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forcing the United States to take sides in the ongoing conflict
between Spain and its former colonies.
In reviewing the district court’s order restoring the cargo to
Spain, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as an appeals court judge,
observed that, although the question of prize “belongs solely to the
courts of the captor,” a belligerent might commit offenses against a
neutral (such as the United States) “which the neutral ought not to
permit; and which give claims upon him, to the party injured by
those operations, which he is not at liberty to disregard.”239 This
proposition suggested the need for a potentially more searching,
fact-intensive role for U.S. courts in examining the circumstances of
foreign captures than Chief Justice Marshall had contemplated
when the Supreme Court was asked to restore the Exchange to its
alleged U.S. owners. He reasoned: “If the wrong doer comes
completely within [the neutral’s] power, and brings that which will
afford complete redress for the wrong done, the usage of nations,
generally, as is believed, certainly the usage of this nation, is to
restore the thing wrongfully taken.”240 Because the Independencia
and its cargo had entered a U.S. port, Chief Justice Marshall
deemed them to be “completely within” the United States’
“power.”241 His analysis thus turned on whether or not Captain
Chaytor had violated U.S. neutrality in seizing Spanish cargo on
behalf of Buenos Aires and, if he had, whether the resulting injury
to Spain should be redressed by litigation rather than diplomacy.
As a threshold matter, Chief Justice Marshall found that the
newly appointed Supreme Director of the United Provinces of Rió
de la Plata, Juan Martín de Pueyrredon, “had a right to grant this
commission at his city of Buenos Ayres [sic].”242 Consequently,
“[c]aptures made under [that commission] will be deemed valid by
that government and by all foreign nations.”243 However, he went
on to find, based on a review of the extensive witness testimony
offered at trial, that “nearly the whole crew of the Independencia
was enlisted within the United States” in violation of U.S.

239
240
241
242
243

Id. at 392.
Id. at 392–93.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

43

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 6

260

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:217

neutrality, and that the capture had therefore “been made, in truth,
by neutral means.”244 As a result of Chaytor’s violation of neutrality,
“the strongest reasons of convenience, and of justice,” supported
restoring the cargo to Spain, even though a competent court of
admiralty had previously condemned it as a prize.245
Having established that the privateer had been outfitted in
violation of U.S. neutrality, Chief Justice Marshall turned to the
question of whether a U.S. court, rather than one of the political
branches, should provide redress by restoring the cargo to Spain.246
He volunteered his “private judgment” that the responsibility for
doing so should “devolve on the executive, or legislative, and not on
the judicial department.”247 This was because, in his view, the
exercise of such a power “must be regulated by a discretion, which
courts do not possess, and may be controlled by reasons of state,
which do not govern tribunals acting on principles of positive
law.”248 Consequently, absent applicable judicial precedent, Chief
Justice Marshall indicated that he would have found restitution
appropriate as a remedy only if authorized by legislation.
Notwithstanding his preference for having the political branches
apply “reasons of state” to resolve this dispute, Chief Justice
Marshall upheld the restitution order based on the “principles of
positive law” articulated in his opinion in The Schooner Exchange.249
Citing his own prior reasoning, he held that the jurisdictional
immunity claimed by national ships of war “is granted, on condition
that the sovereignty of the place be respected,” and that a “breach
of the condition, forfeits the immunity depending on it.”250 This
principle, which Chief Justice Marshall found applicable to captures
made by privateers and by national ships of war and then brought
into neutral U.S. territory, enabled U.S. courts to give “specific
relief” to the injured party without further legislative action.251
Not surprisingly, Chaytor sought to have this appellate decision
reversed by the Supreme Court.252 The parties’ additional
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
246 See id. (“A question of much more difficulty remains to be considered. By what
department of the government is this restitution to be made.”).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 See id. Notably, he did so without drawing attention to his authorship. Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 398.
252 See The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 290 (1822).
244
245
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arguments before the Court merit unpacking, since they presage
contemporary debates about the judiciary’s role in resolving
disputes arising from activities authorized by foreign states. The
case pitted William H. Winder and David Baynard Ogden on behalf
of Chaytor253 against Littleton Waller Tazewell and Daniel Webster
on behalf of Spain.254
Counsel for Chaytor began by insisting that the immunity of a
foreign public ship, including that of its cargo, could not be forfeited
based on allegations that the vessel had illegally augmented its
force in a neutral U.S. port.255 Instead, the appropriate course of
action was for Spain to apply to Buenos Aires—the belligerent
sovereign—for redress.256 Winder argued that “[c]ourts of justice
cannot interfere in such a case, because the sovereign cannot
condescend to appear in them, and they have no regular means of
knowing how far he approves of what has been done by his
officers.”257 Two premises underpin this argument: (1) the par in
parem principle prevented Buenos Aires from appearing in a U.S.
court to defend Chaytor’s actions, which were undertaken by virtue
of the authority conferred by his commission; and (2) absent such
an appearance, a U.S. court could not determine whether or not
Chaytor had exceeded the scope of his commission—in other words,
whether Buenos Aires had actually authorized, approved, or ratified
Chaytor’s acts. Consequently, Winder argued that the matter
should be resolved diplomatically between sovereigns rather than
through litigation.258
253 Former Attorney General William Pinkney, who had argued in support of the
Exchange’s exemption from jurisdiction, had been expected to represent Chaytor, but Pinkney
died before the arguments were held. See JOHN RANDOPLH TUCKER, REMINISCENCES OF
VIRGINIA’S JUDGES AND JURISTS 22 (1895). Some said that Pinkney died “from too intense
study of the case,” but Tazewell denied such rumors, “saying the case involved no very
difficult points, and that Pinkney feared the face of no man living,” himself included. Id.
254 Id. Webster argued points related to the United States’ 1795 treaty with Spain. Tazewell
reportedly recused himself from the treaty-based arguments on the grounds of his
appointment by President Monroe as a commissioner to settle claims under the 1819 treaty
by which Spain ceded Florida to the United States. See HUGH BLAIR GRIGSBY, DISCOURSE ON
THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE HON. LITTLETON WALLER TAZEWELL 45 (1860).
255 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 290 (arguing that “there had been no such
illegal outfit or augmentation of the force of the capturing vessel . . . as would entitle the
original Spanish owners to restitution”).
256 Id. at 313.
257 Id. at 297–98.
258 Id. at 298.
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Tazewell countered that absent a suggestion of immunity for the
Independencia and its cargo, Buenos Aires should be deemed to
have waived its objections to jurisdiction.259 In his view, a
suggestion of immunity filed by the Executive Branch is “the only
proper mode in which the matter of sovereign right can, duly and
orderly, be set before the Court” and the exclusive basis upon which
a court could justly refuse to proceed.260 Moreover, the availability
of Executive Branch suggestions of immunity “avoids all the
technical difficulties of pleading and practice, and places the matter
where, according to the argument, it ought to rest, with the
sovereign.”261 Under Tazewell’s theory, a suggestion by the
Executive Branch should “constitute the law of the Court,” thereby
avoiding a situation in which different branches of government
reach inconsistent conclusions, which would produce “a monstrous
anarchy.”262
Tazewell also articulated what we might today consider a
“restrictive theory” of foreign sovereign immunity under which the
Independencia’s cargo should not be treated as immune.263 He
argued that any exemption from jurisdiction only applies to the
regalian rights of the sovereign—those which are “necessary to
maintain his faith, dignity, and security.”264 Furthermore, he
reasoned that prizes made by public ships should be treated the
same as those made by privateers, even if the public ship itself is
exempt from jurisdiction.265 This was because prize goods “are not
the regalian rights of the sovereign” but rather “a mere accidental,
military possession, which are not indispensably necessary to

259 Today, courts may allow a special appearance by a defendant for purposes of challenging
a court’s jurisdiction without conceding that jurisdiction. See generally Galveston, H. & S.A.
Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496 (1894); Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194
(1893) (finding defendant’s answer challenging jurisdiction did not waive defense).
260 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 302. On the historical origin of suggestions
of immunity, see Section II.B.
261 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 302.
262 Id. at 304; cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (indicating that a case presents a
non-justiciable political question when, among other factors, resolution would involve the
“potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question”).
263 The term “restrictive theory” stands in opposition to an “absolute theory” of foreign
sovereign immunity, under which a foreign sovereign and its activities are categorically
exempt from local jurisdiction. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional
Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 221–22 (1951).
264 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 306.
265 Id. at 308.
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maintain his faith, dignity, or security.”266 Turning to the idea
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange
that there is an “implied pledge given to a foreign state, of
exemption from the local jurisdiction,” Tazewell argued that the
“fiction of extraterritoriality only applies to the peaceful observers
of this implied pledge,” and that the pledge is “forfeited by abusing
the rights of hospitality and asylum.”267 Had the Exchange engaged
in “any misconduct,” he insisted, “she would have been condemned
as unhesitatingly as the most insignificant privateer.”268 The idea of
forfeiting immunity thus animated both Chief Justice Marshall’s
decision to order the cargo restored to Spain and Tazewell’s
argument that the Supreme Court should uphold that decision.
Daniel Webster, also arguing for Spain, rejected the idea that
there was any “general principle” precluding a U.S. court from
examining acts performed by a foreign public ship on the grounds
that this would impermissibly “interfere with the sovereign rights
of the state” to which the ship belonged.269 By analogy, Webster
noted that, even though the U.S. federal and state governments
enjoy sovereign immunity from suit, a court can nonetheless
determine their “sovereign rights” in resolving “a contest between
individuals or corporations.”270 Similarly, he argued, a U.S. court’s
ability to nullify a capture made under a foreign commission that
was granted in violation of neutrality and to restore that cargo to
the original owner is a “necessary and inevitable consequence” of
the rules governing neutrality.271 This would be true, he contended,
even with respect to a foreign public ship that would otherwise be
entitled to claim immunity from U.S. jurisdiction.272
Justice Story, writing for the Supreme Court, began by indicating
that, consistent with “the settled practice between nations,” the
Court would treat the duly authenticated commission of the
266 Id. Ogden, responding for Chaytor, deemed Tazewell’s reasoning about the separate
status of the ship and its cargo unpersuasive and asked rhetorically: “If the fiction of
extraterritoriality will protect the ship, which is the principal, why will it not protect the prize
goods which are the incidents?” Id. at 332.
267 Id. at 308–09.
268 Id. at 315–16.
269 Id. at 316.
270 Id. at 317.
271 Id. at 320–21.
272 Id. at 321.
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Independencia as proof of its public character, even absent a bill of
sale.273 In so doing, he accepted the idea that examining the means
by which title to the ship was obtained “would be to exert the right
of examining into the validity of the acts of the foreign sovereign,
and to sit in judgment upon them in cases where [the sovereign] has
not conceded the jurisdiction, and where it would be inconsistent
with his own supremacy.”274 Justice Story observed that U.S.
neutrality in the wars between Spain and its former colonies meant
that captures made by each side “must be considered as having the
same validity, and all the immunities which may be claimed by
public ships in our ports under the law of nations must be
considered as equally the right of each,” without entering into
arguments regarding whether any of the disputed territories should
be treated as sovereign states for other purposes.275
Although the evidentiary record was contradictory at best,
Justice Story observed that Chaytor had proffered no evidence to
show that the enlistment of U.S. citizens during the Independencia’s
stay in Baltimore was lawful.276 Chaytor thus failed to satisfy his
burden to show that he had not violated U.S. neutrality. This illegal
augmentation of force “infect[ed] the captures subsequently made
with the character of torts”—a proposition Justice Story deemed
established by cases “so numerous and so uniform, that it would be
a waste of time to discuss them, or to examine the reasoning by
which they are supported.”277
Justice Story’s account of jurisdictional immunity embraced
Chief Justice Marshall’s theory of forfeiture, which had also been
adopted and advanced by Tazewell.278 Invoking The Schooner
Exchange, Justice Story emphasized that a foreign sovereign does
not have “an absolute right, in virtue of his sovereignty, to an
exemption of his property from the local jurisdiction of another

Id. at 336.
Id.
275 Id. at 337.
276 Id. at 345–46 (“[T]hroughout this voluminous record, not a scintilla of evidence exists
to show that any person on board of either vessel was a native of Buenos Ayres [sic].”)
277 Id. at 348–49. Like Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Story did not find “in reason or in
policy any ground for distinction between captures in violation of our neutrality by public
ships, and by privateers” acting under a commission from a foreign government. Id. at 351.
However, he acknowledged the force of the claim that a public ship of war and, by extension,
all property captured by such a ship, is “exempted from the local jurisdiction by the universal
assent of nations.” Id. at 352.
278 Id. at 306–08.
273
274
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sovereign, when it came within his territory” because “that would
be to give him sovereign power beyond the limits of his own
empire.”279 Rather, such an exemption “stands upon principles of
public comity and convenience, and arises from the presumed
consent or license of nations.”280 Importantly, such license or
consent “may be withdrawn [by the forum state] upon notice at any
time, without just offence.”281 Justice Story further reasoned that
“whatever may be the exemption of the public ship herself, and of
her armament and munitions of war, the prize property which she
brings within [U.S.] ports is liable to the jurisdiction of [U.S.]
Courts.”282 Because the Independencia had unlawfully enlisted U.S.
citizens in violation of U.S. neutrality before capturing the Spanish
cargo, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree restoring the cargo to
Spain and awarded costs to the Spanish consul.283
These cases against foreign officials and foreign ships in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries compelled courts to
grapple with issues that continue to resonate today, including: (1)
the allocation of authority between the executive and judicial
branches regarding questions of jurisdictional immunities and the
resolution of private disputes that implicated sovereign rights; (2)
the method for communicating Executive Branch views to the courts
and the deference owed those communications; and (3) the
possibility that foreign sovereign immunity might be conditioned on
the outcome of fact-based inquiries, even though immunity was also
meant to shield a litigant from the burdens (or “indignity”) of trial.
Other doctrines also evolved to help courts navigate related issues,
including the act of state and political question doctrines.284
However, defendants understandably sought—and continue to
seek—the dismissal of claims at the outset for lack of jurisdiction,
rather than relying exclusively on justiciability doctrines.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 353. “Comity” is at the heart of immunity and is frequently invoked (although less
frequently defined) in transnational cases today. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 221, at 2071.
281 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 353.
282 Id. at 354.
283 Id. at 353–55.
284 See generally John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 507
(2016) (discussing the act of state doctrine in depth); Harlan Grant Cohen, A
Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2017) (exploring the
political question doctrine).
279
280
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Although cases involving individual officials were rare (since the
assertion of personal jurisdiction generally required the individual
to be present and served with process within the United States),285
cases involving disputes over the ownership of foreign ships
continued to present these tricky issues. Part III describes the
practice ultimately adopted in cases involving foreign ships, which
was later supplanted by the enactment of statutes governing
diplomatic immunity and foreign state immunity, respectively.286
Certain claims to non-statutory foreign official immunity, however,
continue to challenge the boundary between “principles of positive
law” and “reasons of state.”287 Tracing the evolution of courts’
approaches to immunity questions in the pre-FSIA period creates a
more solid foundation upon which to build contemporary doctrines
of common law immunity.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMON LAW IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, successive
attorneys general deflected pressure from foreign governments to
intervene in private litigation against foreign ships and foreign
officials by emphasizing that the constitutional separation of
powers forbade them from compelling the dismissal of suits.288 They
came to realize, however, that protracted proceedings could cause
significant problems for foreign relations. Consequently, U.S.
Attorneys developed a practice of submitting “suggestions of
immunity” to courts in cases that implicated U.S. national
interests.289 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed claims to foreign
sovereign immunity in cases, including The Schooner Exchange and
The Santissima Trinidad, which treated immunity as a
comity-based exception to the United States’ plenary territorial
jurisdiction.290
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the U.S. Supreme Court summarized the
entirety of U.S. sovereign immunity law in a single paragraph,
285 See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (requiring service of process within
the state in order to assert personal jurisdiction).
286 See Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)−(e) (2012) (governing
diplomatic immunity); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602−1611 (2012) (governing foreign state immunity).
287 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
288 See supra Section II.A.
289 See supra Section II.B.
290 See supra Section II.D.
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indicating that “[f]ollowing [The] Schooner Exchange, a two-step
procedure developed for resolving a foreign state’s claim of
sovereign immunity, typically asserted on behalf of seized
vessels.”291 According to the Samantar Court’s summary of
historical practice, U.S. courts “surrendered [their] jurisdiction” if
the State Department filed a suggestion of immunity; if the State
Department did not file a suggestion, then courts “decided for
[themselves] whether all the requisites for such immunity
existed.”292 The Samantar Court indicated that the State
Department “has from the time of the FSIA’s enactment understood
the Act to leave intact the Department’s role in official immunity
cases,”293 and that the Court was “given no reason to believe that
Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State
Department’s role in determinations regarding individual official
immunity.”294 As explored in Part II, however, the State
Department’s role was not historically understood as entailing the
authority to divest courts of jurisdiction, even though its
determinations (for example, regarding the status of an
ambassador) could have that legal effect.295 The summary
paragraph in Samantar is best understood as descriptive rather
than prescriptive. Because of its cursory treatment of historical
practice—which was not critical to the statutory interpretation
question at hand—the Samantar opinion leaves ample room to
deepen our understanding of the historical record and its potential
implications for contemporary common law immunity claims.
A. THE RISE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

Although the first suggestion of immunity was filed in the
1790s,296 the judicial practice regarding suggestions of immunity
referenced by the Samantar Court dates back only to the late
1930s.297 Decisions leading up to that period hewed closely to the
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010).
Id.
293 Id. at 324 n.19.
294 Id. at 323.
295 See supra Part II.
296 See supra notes 101−04 and accompanying text.
297 See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311 (referencing cases adjudicating immunity—the earliest
dating from 1938).
291
292
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model of judicial independence established by the Founding
generation.298 Chronicling these decisions enables us to pinpoint the
shift to a more deferential approach by the courts and to assess its
rationale. To be sure, doctrinal change did not occur in a social and
political vacuum, although documenting those broader shifts lies
outside the scope of this paper. Without discounting these
exogenous factors, it is still instructive to trace, and to unpack, the
reasons given by judges and advocates for their approach to
immunity claims.
1. The Tradition of Judicial Independence.
The path to a more deferential posture towards Executive
Branch suggestions of immunity was anything but linear. For
example, in 1852, the United States, through U.S. Attorney J.
Prescott Hall, filed a suggestion of immunity on behalf of the
steamer Pizzaro.299 In that case, Judge Samuel Rossiter Betts of the
Southern District of New York took the interesting approach of
treating the U.S. suggestion as a request to substitute the United
States for the foreign defendant.300 In his view, The Schooner
Exchange established
[t]he prerogative of the government of the United States
to subrogate itself a party in place of the nation owning
the offending ship, with the right to supersede all
inquiry into the merits of the suit by a preliminary
exception to the competency of the court to take
cognizance of it.301
The idea of subrogation went beyond that of a suggestion and
considered the United States as stepping into the shoes of the
foreign government. Absent such intervention by the Executive
Branch, a U.S. court could consider—but was not constrained to
follow—representations made by a foreign government about the
public status of a ship and its corresponding exemption from

298 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486–87 (1983) (describing
prior approach to sovereign immunity).
299 The Pizzaro v. Matthias, 19 F. Cas. 786, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1852).
300 Id.
301 Id.
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jurisdiction under the principles articulated in The Schooner
Exchange.302
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange
grounded the jurisdictional immunity of a friendly foreign ship of
war on the tacit consent of the forum state.303 It would seem to follow
that if the Executive Branch explicitly indicated a lack of such
consent, a court would decline to recognize a ship’s immunity. Not
so in Berrizi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, whose significance has
remained under-studied.304 In that case, the State Department
expressed the view that merchant ships owned by foreign states
were not entitled to immunity.305 Notwithstanding the Executive
Branch’s apparent position that proceeding with the litigation
would not be problematic from a foreign policy perspective,
successive judicial opinions from the lower courts grappled with
how to resolve the immunity question. The lack of judicial deference
in Berizzi Bros. contrasts sharply with the deferential posture
adopted in a trilogy of subsequent cases explored in Section III.A.2.
The dispute began when the Pesaro, an Italian steamship,
carried a shipment of olive oil from Genoa to New York.306 After
reaching New York, the ship was arrested pursuant to a libel filed
in district court by Giovanni Luzzato and Joseph G. Luzzato seeking
$4,800 in damages.307 They claimed that “certain merchandise” had
been placed on board the steamship in good condition in Genoa, but
that it had arrived in New York “not in like good order and condition
as when shipped, but slack, short, seriously injured and
damaged.”308 A threshold question in the litigation was whether the
ship was immune from jurisdiction because it was allegedly owned
by Italy.
See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
304 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (holding that a ship owned by a friendly government operated for
merchandise for hire for the nation is immune from arrest).
305 See id. at 564 (“Under the Italian law no immunity is afforded to merchant ships. It
would certainly seem an anomaly to grant to the Pesaro an immunity in our courts which she
would not have in her own country and which a similar ship, owned and operated by the
United States, would not enjoy either in the United States or in Italy.”).
306 Traverse to Suggestion, Luzzato v. Pesaro, Case No. 71-179 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1920) (on
file with author).
307 Id.
308 Id.
302
303
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The district court’s first task was to establish the character of the
ship.309 The Italian Ambassador filed an affidavit authenticated by
the State Department indicating that the ship was owned by, and
was in the possession of, the Italian government, leading the Italian
Ambassador to argue that it should be immune from suit on that
basis.310 In opposition, the Luzzatos submitted an affidavit by
Charles Hann, Jr., an attorney and former U.S. Naval Reserve
officer, who described boarding the Pesaro and observing that the
crew members were “dressed in civilian clothes and appeared no
differently from the seamen of ordinary mercantile vessels.”311
Hann attested that the captain told him that “the ship was not an
Italian Navy or Italian Government ship.”312 The evidence thus
pointed in different directions.
Notwithstanding these conflicting characterizations, Judge John
Knox immediately entered a handwritten judgment releasing the
ship from arrest:
Upon the suggestion of the Italian Ambassador filed
herein to the effect that the ship S.S. Pesaro is owned
by the Italian Government and now in its possession
and manned by a crew of said Government, I vacate the
attachment [illegible], conceiving myself so bound to do
under the authority of The Carla Poma decided by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for this Circuit.313
Undeterred by this adverse ruling, the Luzzatos filed a
“traverse,” objecting to the Ambassador’s characterization of the
Pesaro and indicating that the Ambassador should have filed “a
suggestion verified as to fact by the State Department of the United

309 Suggestion of Want of Jurisdiction, Luzzato v. Pesaro, Case No. 71-179 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
20, 1920) (on file with author).
310 Id.
311 Affidavit of Charles Hann, Jr., Luzzato v. Pesaro, Case No. 71-179 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20,
1920) (on file with author).
312 Id.
313 Order Granting Motion, Luzzato v. Pesaro, Case No. 71-179 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1920).
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently vacated the Second Circuit’s decision in The Carlo
Poma because the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, which instead should
have been taken directly to the Court. The Carlo Poma, 255 U.S. 219, 219–20 (1921) (on file
with author) (dismissing based on the ground “that its ownership and possession by a foreign
power place it beyond jurisdiction in admiralty”).
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States.”314 This procedural misstep, they argued, invalidated the
district court’s decision to release the ship.315
The Luzzatos made a clever argument in favor of disregarding
the representations made by the Italian Ambassador. They claimed
that, had the State Department filed a suggestion of immunity, they
could have argued against it “without any undue discourtesy to the
dignity of a foreign sovereign.”316 In the instant case, however, they
protested that that they were unfairly disadvantaged by their
inability to challenge the veracity of an affidavit from the Italian
Ambassador without insulting Italy.317 They thus objected to the
admissibility of the affidavit and urged the court to allow them to
develop the factual record before ruling on the prayer for
immunity.318 In today’s terms, their petition amounted to a request
for jurisdictional discovery, to which they attached the bill of lading
for their shipment and an additional affidavit from Mr. Hann. When
Judge Knox denied this petition, they appealed directly to the
Supreme Court.319
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Willis
Van Devanter, observed that, apart from the Ambassador’s affidavit
indicating Italian ownership and possession of the ship, “there was
nothing pointing to an absence of jurisdiction.”320 The Court
apparently gave the Ambassador’s suggestion much less weight
than had Judge Knox. Justice Van Devanter noted that, although
the affidavit was accompanied by “a certificate of the Secretary of
State stating that the Ambassador was the duly accredited
diplomatic representative of Italy,” the Secretary’s certification
“gave no sanction to the suggestion.”321 The Court therefore deemed
that the Ambassador’s representation was “nothing more” than a
suggestion in the literal sense of the word and held that in order “to
be entertained the suggestion should come through official channels

314 See Traverse to Suggestion, Luzzato v. Pesaro, Case No. 71-179 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1920)
(on file with author).
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 See generally The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216 (1921).
320 Id. at 216.
321 Id. at 218–19.
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of the United States.”322 It remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings because “[w]ith the suggestion eliminated,
as it should have been, there obviously was not basis for holding
that the ship was not subject to the court’s process.”323 The Luzzatos’
position was vindicated, at least temporarily.
Not long after the Court remanded Luzzato v. The Pesaro to the
district court, another claimant—the Berizzi Brothers Company—
filed a libel against the same ship.324 The jurisdictional dispute in
both cases came before Circuit Judge Julian Mack, who was sitting
as a judge of the district court.325 Judge Mack noted that “the
question whether the ship of a foreign government used and
operated by it as a merchant vessel is, when within the waters of
the United States, immune from arrest in admiralty”326 was a new
one that had only recently been addressed—but not resolved—by
the Supreme Court in two cases: In re Hussein Lufti Bey and In re
Muir.327 In addition to canvassing relevant U.S. and foreign cases,
Judge Mack asked the Department of State for its views.328 In
response, the Department indicated:
It is the view of the Department that
government-owned merchant vessels or vessels under
requisition of governments whose flag they fly employed
in commerce should not be regarded as entitled to the
immunities accorded public vessels of war. The
Department has not claimed immunity for American
vessels of this character. In cases of private litigation in
American ports involving merchant vessels owned by
foreign governments, the Department has made it a
practice carefully to refrain from taking any action

Id. at 217.
Id. at 219.
324 See generally The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (overruling objections to
jurisdiction).
325 Id. at 473.
326 Id. at 474.
327 See In re Hussein Lufti Bey, 256 U.S. 616, 619 (1921) (indicating that “the question is
an open one and of uncertain solution”); In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 531 (1921) (indicating that
the question “is one of obvious delicacy and importance” and that “[n]o decision by this court
up to this time can be said to answer it”).
328 The Pesaro, 277 F. at 479.
322
323
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which might constitute an interference by the
authorities of this government in such litigation.329
This response did not amount to an explicit, case-specific
suggestion of non-immunity. Nevertheless, Judge Mack gave
weight—although not dispositive weight—to the State
Department’s decision to refrain from suggesting immunity for the
Pesaro.330
Judge Mack indicated that “[t]he general principle of the
immunity of a sovereign state from suit without its express consent
is too deeply imbedded in our law to be uprooted by judicial
decision.”331 However, he also noted an “observable . . . tendency to
restrict its application or to guard against its extension.”332 In his
view, a court asked to resolve a new problem should strive to reach
conclusions that, “if possible, conform to the practical ends of the
law in a moving, working world.”333 His adaptive approach to the
question of jurisdictional immunity, which has gone largely
unnoticed, warrants quoting at greater length:
[I]n dealing with an unsettled problem in the
application of sovereign immunity, the court must not
only consider history and logic; it must also look behind
and beyond both and inquire whether the public
interests justify or require an extension of sovereign
329 Id. at 479–80 n.3 (quoting a letter from the Secretary of State, transmitted through the
Solicitor for the State Department, dated August 2, 1921).
330 Id. at 479.
331 Id. at 474.
332 Id. at 475. This “observable tendency” has been described as a shift from an absolute
theory of immunity to a restrictive theory of immunity. As recounted by then-Professor Jack
B. Tate in a 1954 speech to the Bar Association of the City of New York: “After the end of
World War I, the courts of many countries abandoned the classical theory and adopted the
restricted theory, no doubt due to the entry into trade by so many states during and since
that war.” Robert M. Jarvis, The Tate Letter: Some Words Regarding Its Authorship, 55 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 465, 470 (2015). The United States officially announced its adoption of the
restrictive theory in a letter signed by Tate in his capacity as Acting Legal Adviser for the
State Department in May 1952. Id. As Tate recounted in his later speech, the letter was
subject to “meticulous intra- and inter-departmental clearances” before being published. Id.
at 471. He also pointed out that the letter explicitly notes that while “a shift in policy by the
executive cannot control the courts,” the Department believed that courts would be “less likely
to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so.” Id.
333 The Pesaro, 277 F. at 475.
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exemption from the usual processes of judicial justice.
With the growth and development of state activity, it
behooves the court to consider the consequences which
would flow from a ruling removing from the ordinary
judicial administration matters of vital importance to
the community, which have for centuries been handled
through the regular judicial processes.334
This opinion anticipates the adoption of the restrictive theory of
foreign sovereign immunity, which denies jurisdictional immunity
to foreign states for their commercial activities. Judge Mack
reasoned that because, under admiralty law, a ship is “treated as an
entity separate and distinct” from the ship’s owner, “the immunity
of a public ship should depend primarily not upon her ownership
but upon the nature of the service in which she is engaged and the
purpose for which she is employed.”335 In light of this reasoning,
combined with the State Department’s letter and the parties’
agreement that Italian courts would “refuse to grant immunity” in
cases involving public merchant vessels, Judge Mack found that the
Pesaro was “not exempt from suit in the United States, by reason of
its governmental ownership and operation.”336
Judge Mack’s 1921 decision, though well-reasoned, was not the
final word on the matter. In 1924, the Supreme Court decided The
Gul Djemal, in which an arrested ship’s captain claimed that the
ship was immune from arrest because it was owned and possessed
by the Turkish government.337 The district court denied the claim to
jurisdictional immunity on the grounds that the vessel was
“engaged in commercial trade, under charter for hire to a private
trader” and that “because diplomatic relations between the United
States and Turkey were then severed . . . no appropriate suggestion
was filed from the State Department of the United States.”338 The
Supreme Court affirmed this decision on the narrow grounds that
the ship’s captain was not authorized to represent the Turkish
government in claiming immunity for the ship.339

334
335
336
337
338
339

Id.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 479, 483.
The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90, 91 (1924).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
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Judge Mack’s assessment of the Pesaro’s character had been
based solely on representations made by Giovanni Bertolini, the
ship’s master.340 In light of the holding in The Gul Djemal
suggesting that this evidence was inadequate, the parties agreed to
vacate the decision.341 They reargued the case before District Judge
Augustus N. Hand based on an expanded record that contained a
claim and answer filed by the Italian Ambassador, Don Gelasio
Caetani.342
Judge Hand, unlike Judge Mack, found that a straightforward
application of prevailing law required dismissing the case.343 He
took issue with Judge Mack’s reasoning, which he characterized as
representing the view of a small minority.344 Instead, he adopted the
approach taken by Circuit Judge Charles Merrill Hough sitting as
a district court judge in The Maipo,345 a case involving a Chilean
ship.346
In The Maipo, Judge Hough stated in his oral opinion that a
public ship of war was exempt from seizure “[n]ot because it was a
war vessel, but because it was a part of the exercise or manifestation
of sovereign power.”347 In Hough’s opinion, any other foreign
sovereign vessel or property is exempt “[f]or the same reason, just
as the sovereign himself is exempt.”348 This was so, despite Hough’s
own view that “when a sovereign republic, empire, or whatnot, goes
into business and engages in the carrying trade, it ought to be
subject to the liabilities of carriers just as much as any private
person.”349 However, Hough disavowed any ability “as one of the

The Pesaro, 277 F. at 475.
See The Pesaro, 13 F.2d 468, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (noting that Judge Mack’s order
overruling jurisdictional objections was “vacated by consent of the parties”).
342 See id. (“The Italian ambassador has filed a claim and answer, in which governmental
rights are reserved by order of court.”).
343 See id. at 469 (“Because of what has already been written by the judges of this circuit
on the subject of immunity of the property of a sovereign, further discussion in a court of first
instance seems futile.”).
344 See id. (observing that Judge Mack’s earlier opinion “differ[s] from the great weight of
authority in favor of the immunity of a sovereign in a case like this”).
345 The Maipo, 259 F. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
346 See The Pesaro, 13 F.2d at 468 (noting that Judge Hough’s opinion in The Maipo
“represent[s] the current view”).
347 The Maipo, 259 F. at 367.
348 Id. at 368.
349 Id.
340
341
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humbler officers of the government of the United States to define
for the Republic of Chile what that republic should consider to be a
governmental function.”350 He therefore treated Chile’s
representation as conclusive regarding the character of the ship and
its corresponding entitlement to jurisdictional immunity.351
Judge Hough did not rule out the possibility that the Executive
Branch could reach a different conclusion regarding the treatment
owed Chilean property.352 However, in his view, such a
determination by U.S. authorities should be conveyed “through
diplomatic channels, and not through the judiciary.”353 To proceed
otherwise would allow the judiciary to contribute “to what might
become, under conceivable circumstances, a casus belli,” or cause for
war.354 He thus deemed any question about the ship’s public
character to be “not justiciable, but diplomatic,” even though he
acknowledged that the consequences of finding a ship immune from
seizure based on the representations of a foreign government would
be “very hard” for private persons seeking a damages remedy in U.S.
court.355
In view of Judge Hough’s opinion in The Maipo and other district
court opinions, Judge Hand opined that “further discussion in a
court of first instance seems futile, and the matter should await the
authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court.”356 The record
does not indicate that Judge Hand sought additional input from the
State Department, which had earlier informed Judge Mack of its
view that “government-owned merchant vessels . . . employed in
commerce should not be regarded as entitled to the immunities
accorded public vessels of war.”357
The definitive judicial pronouncement on private litigants’
claims to the Pesaro finally came several months later in the
Supreme Court’s first decision to address the immunity of a foreign
government-owned merchant ship engaged in commerce.358 Justice
Id.
See id. (acknowledging the jurisdictional immunity of the Maipo arises “because the
[ship] is the property of and a portion of the sovereignty of the Republic of Chile”).
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id. (italics added).
355 Id.
356 The Pesaro, 13 F.2d 468, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
357 The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479–80 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
358 See generally Berrizi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). Like Judge Hand,
the U.S. Supreme Court does not appear to have sought the views of the Attorney General or
350
351
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Van Devanter, who had written the Court’s opinion five years
earlier in Luzzato v. The Pesaro, also penned the Court’s opinion in
Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro.359 Although the case presented a
novel question, the Court looked to the principles articulated by
Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange for guidance. In
Justice Van Devanter’s view, it was unsurprising that Chief Justice
Marshall had not considered whether government-owned-andoperated merchant ships were entitled to immunity because “there
was little thought of governments engaging in such operations” in
1812.360 He indicated that “[t]he principal case announcing the other
view” was Judge Mack’s original opinion, which was superseded by
Judge Hand’s decision after the case was reargued.361 The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed Judge Hand’s decision, finding the ship
immune from process because the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to
district courts was “not intended to include a libel in rem against a
public ship, such as the Pesaro, of a friendly foreign government.”362
With the exception of Judge Mack, who explicitly solicited the
views of the State Department, the various judges confronted with
claims to immunity for the Pesaro declined to subject the Pesaro to
U.S. jurisdiction. They treated the jurisdictional determination as a
straightforward legal question and cited The Schooner Exchange as
requiring the exemption of foreign public ships from U.S.
jurisdiction, without regard for the views of the Executive Branch.
Before long, however, that approach would undergo substantial
change.

the Department of State on this matter. Id. Its judgment makes no reference to the
submission previously provided by the Executive Branch in response to Judge Mack’s request.
Id.
359 Id. at 569.
360 Id. at 573.
361 Id. at 576.
362 Id. Once again, the judiciary found itself in the position of creating a “safety valve” for
cases that would not have been heard in U.S. courts but for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction
to the district courts in Glass v. The Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794). See supra note 168 and
accompanying text. The difference between the Pesaro litigation and the dispute over the
Exchange is that the State Department expressed no objection to the former, leaving the
judiciary to self-limit even in the absence of specific foreign relations concerns.
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2. The Shift Towards Judicial Deference.
In the late 1930s, a dispute arose over the Spanish merchant
vessel Navemar, and the State Department declined Spain’s request
to intervene on its behalf.363 In its opinion, the Supreme Court
indicated that “it is open to a friendly government to assert . . . the
public status of the vessel and to claim her immunity from suit,
either through diplomatic channels or, if it chooses, as a claimant in
the courts of the United States.”364 This statement appeared to give
foreign governments a choice between requesting assistance from
the State Department and appearing in the proceedings.
In The Navemar, the Court cited the 1796 qui tam proceeding
involving the Cassius and Chief Justice Marshall’s 1812 opinion in
The Schooner Exchange for the proposition that “[i]f the claim [to
immunity] is allowed by the executive branch of our government, it
is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel upon appropriate
suggestion by the Attorney General of the United States, or other
officer acting under his direction.”365 Since the Attorney General
had not filed a suggestion, however, this observation was not
relevant to resolving the dispute at hand.366 It remains unclear why
the Court made this observation, except perhaps to explain why the
Spanish government was entitled to appear and demand possession
of the disputed vessel.
In 1943, five years after The Navemar, the Supreme Court
decided Ex parte Republic of Peru and affirmed the principle of
deference to Executive Branch suggestions.367 In that case, Peru
requested that the Supreme Court prohibit the District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana from exercising in rem jurisdiction
over the Peruvian steamship Ucayali.368 Additionally, Peru asked
the State Department to recognize its claim of immunity.369 At the
State Department’s request, the Attorney General instructed the
U.S. Attorney to convey the Peruvian Ambassador’s formal claim of
363 See The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 71 (1938) (“Meanwhile the Department of State had
refused to act upon the Spanish Government’s claim of possession and ownership . . . [and]
had decline to honor the request of the Ambassador that representations be made in the
pending suit . . . on behalf of the Spanish Government . . . .”).
364 Id. at 74.
365 Id. at 68.
366 The Court also cited Judge Betts’s 1852 decision in The Pizzaro. See supra note 299 and
accompanying text.
367 See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
368 Id.
369 Id.
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immunity to the district court.370 The U.S. Attorney included a
statement that the State Department “accepts as true the
statements of the Ambassador concerning the steamship Ucayali,
and recognizes and allows the claim of immunity.”371 This statement
indicated that the Department had determined the reliability of a
certain version of the facts, and recognized the legal consequences
that, in the Department’s view, flowed from those facts.372
In response to Peru’s petition and the accompanying U.S.
suggestion, the Supreme Court held that the Executive Branch can
settle a dispute between a private claimant and a foreign
government through diplomacy instead of litigation:
When the Secretary [of State] elects, as he may and as
he appears to have done in this case, to settle claims
against the vessel by diplomatic negotiations between
the two countries rather than by continued litigation in
the courts, it is of public importance that the action of
the political arm of the Government taken within its
appropriate sphere be promptly recognized, and that
the delay and inconvenience of a prolonged litigation be
avoided by prompt termination of the proceedings in the
district court.373
The Court emphasized that “in the absence of recognition of the
immunity by the Department of State” the district court would have
had authority to determine for itself whether or not the ship was
entitled to immunity.374 But in the Court’s view, the district court
should have relinquished this authority “in conformity to [the]
overriding principle of substantive law” that “courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the
property of a friendly sovereign, as to embarrass the executive arm
of the Government in conducting foreign relations.”375 This principle
of non-embarrassment echoes French Minister Sérurier’s rationale
370
371
372
373
374
375

Id. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 587–88.
Id. at 588.
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for urging Secretary of State Monroe to order the release of the
Exchange.376 It does not explain, however, why something that was
once firmly believed to exceed the Executive’s authority was now
deemed an “overriding principle of substantive law.”
In support of its conclusion that exercising jurisdiction in this
case would embarrass the political branches and was therefore
impermissible, the Court found that “[t]he certification and the
request that the vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the
courts as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the
Government that the continued retention of the vessel interferes
with the proper conduct of our foreign relations.”377 The Court’s
rationale for deferring to the Executive Branch’s endorsement of
diplomacy over litigation in Peru thus turned on the separation of
powers and the allocation of responsibility for the conduct of foreign
relations to the political branches.
The Court reaffirmed this rationale for judicial deference two
years later in dicta in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, in which the
United States did not take a position on the question of immunity.378
In that case, the owner of the Lottie Carson, an American fishing
vessel, filed a libel against the Baja California, a Mexican ship, for
allegedly causing a collision with the Lottie Carson in Mexican
waters.379 In response, Mexico claimed that the Baja California was
immune from judicial seizure.380 The U.S. Attorney filed a
communication sent by the Secretary of State to the Attorney
General declining to take a position with respect to the asserted
immunity of the vessel and citing two previous cases holding that a
vessel is entitled to immunity if it is in the possession and public
service of a foreign government.381 The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court’s holding that the Mexican government’s
mere title to the vessel was insufficient to support the claim of
jurisdictional immunity.382 In so doing, the Court again drew a
straight line from The Schooner Exchange to contemporary cases
involving merchant vessels:
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. at 589.
378 See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (explaining that “the courts
should not so act as to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs”).
379 Id. at 31.
380 Id. at 38.
381 Id. at 31–32.
382 Id.
376
377
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[I]n The Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall introduced
the practice, since followed in the federal courts, that
their jurisdiction in rem acquired by the judicial seizure
of the vessel of a friendly foreign government, will be
surrendered on recognition, allowance and certification
of the asserted immunity by the political branch of the
government charged with the conduct of foreign affairs
when its certificate to that effect is presented to the
court by the Attorney General . . . . This practice is
founded upon the policy recognized both by the
Department of State and the courts that the national
interests will be best served when controversies
growing out of the judicial seizure of vessels of friendly
foreign governments are adjusted through diplomatic
channels rather than by the compulsion of judicial
proceedings.383
The Court continued: “It is therefore not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow
an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen
fit to recognize.”384 This was so, the Court reasoned, even though it
had not followed the position of the Executive Branch two decades
earlier in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro.385 In that case, as
described above, the Court held that a merchant ship owned and
operated by Italy was immune from in rem proceedings because
merchant ships “held and used by a government for a public
purpose . . . are public ships in the same sense that war ships
are,”386 even though the Department of State took the opposite
view.387 The Berizzi Bros. Court treated immunity as a question of
law, whereas the Peru and Hoffman Courts approached it as a
hybrid matter of law and diplomacy.

383
384
385
386
387

Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 35 n.1.
Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926).
Id.
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B. THE ROLE OF “REASONS OF STATE”

Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a circuit court judge in the
dispute over the Independencia’s cargo, articulated the idea that the
exercise of jurisdiction might be subject to diplomatic considerations
when he said that it “must be regulated by a discretion, which courts
do not possess, and may be controlled by reasons of state, which do
not govern tribunals acting on principles of positive law.”388
However, in his assessment, “reasons of state” do not govern courts
“acting on principles of positive law.”389 The Peru Court blurred this
distinction when it referred to the “overriding principle of
substantive law” that “courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction,
by the seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign,
as to embarrass the executive arm of the Government in conducting
foreign relations.”390 The Peru Court conceptualized the boundary
between law and diplomacy as permeable and viewed the authority
to make binding immunity determinations as an incident of the
Executive Branch’s foreign relations power.
This is, indeed, how the Executive Branch currently interprets
the scope of its authority, which stands in stark contrast to the
disclaimers it issued in the cases explored in Part II. Under this
approach, “suggestions” of immunity are a misnomer. As U.S.
Department of Justice attorney Lewis Yelin, writing in his personal
capacity, has indicated, “[a]lthough denominated a ‘suggestion’ of
immunity, the government’s filing informs the courts that the
Executive Branch’s immunity determination is binding.”391 Yelin
acknowledges that “if the Executive Branch has authority to direct
the dismissal of a suit that power must derive from the
Constitution.”392 In his view, and as articulated by the U.S.
government in recent suggestions of immunity, such authority
stems from the Executive Branch’s responsibility for the conduct of
foreign affairs.393
That the deferential posture articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Peru and Hoffman should apply in cases involving foreign
Chacon v. Eighty-Nine Bales of Cochineal, 5 F. Cas. 390, 397 (C.C.D. Va. 1821).
Id.
390 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
391 Yelin, supra note 12, at 915 n.15.
392 Id. at 916.
393 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra
note 11, at 10.
388
389
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officials is not a foregone conclusion. As Ingrid Wuerth points out,
Peru and Hoffman “were decided during World War II, and the
President often enjoys deference during wartime.”394 It is also
plausible that, as Yelin suggests, courts during this period “began
to doubt the stability of the governing immunity rule in
international practice, and in the absence of any legislative
guidance, courts increasingly looked to the Executive Branch for the
applicable principles.”395 He continues: “As the governing
international principles became less clear and as the Executive
asserted views contrary to the prevailing judicial norm [of absolute
immunity], the courts began to hew more closely to executive branch
articulations of foreign sovereign immunity principles, until the
practice of absolute deference arose.”396
At the State Department’s urging, the 1976 FSIA returned the
paramount authority to resolve certain disputes involving foreign
sovereign immunity to the judicial branch.397 The picture remains
murkier, however, when it comes to the respective roles of the
judicial and executive branches in determining the immunities of
foreign officials, which the FSIA does not prescribe.
The Executive Branch interprets Samantar as an endorsement
of the practice of judicial deference articulated in Peru and
Hoffman.398 Others, including Wuerth, argue that “the better
interpretation [of Samantar] is the more literal one: Congress did
not seek to do anything with respect to individual immunity cases,
Wuerth, supra note 5, at 926.
Yelin, supra note 12, at 961.
396 Id. at 983.
397 See, e.g., Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
in Perspective: A Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 304–05 (1986) (noting a
“principal objective” of the FSIA was to grant authority to courts to determine sovereign
immunity); Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 65 (1978) (“The intent of the Immunities Act was to place in the courts
the determination whether a foreign sovereign was entitled to immunity.”); Frederic Alan
Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE
STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 2 (1976) (explaining power is granted to the courts “to decide
claims of foreign state immunity from their process” and that the statute “withdraws the
State Department’s authority both to prescribe and to apply rival standards of immunity”).
398 See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity by the United States at 9, Doğan v. Barak, No. 2:15CV-08130-ODW-GJS (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2016) (“It is . . . not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.” (quoting Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945))).
394
395
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either to authorize or eliminate the practice.”399 From the Samantar
decision to the time of writing, no court appears to have granted
immunity to an individual defendant where the Executive Branch
suggested non-immunity, or denied immunity to an individual
defendant where the Executive Branch suggested immunity. That
said, lower courts have not been uniform in the degree of deference
they have accorded these suggestions, or the basis upon which they
have accorded deference.
To the extent that the pre-FSIA practice referenced by the
Samantar Court informs the content of the “common-law regime” of
official immunity, it is important to recognize that this practice was
not uniform in either its reasoning or its results. For example, in
the pivotal Hoffman case, Justices Frankfurter and Black concurred
in the Court’s opinion but would have found that U.S. courts “should
not disclaim jurisdiction” over vessels owned by foreign
governments except when the Executive Branch or Congress
“explicitly asserts that the proper conduct of [foreign] relations calls
for judicial abstention.”400 By contrast, Judge Mack in The Pesaro
would have taken into account the failure of the State Department
to intervene but would not have said “that immunity should be
refused in a clear case simply because the executive branch has
failed to act.”401 After all, the Executive Branch is not automatically
notified when a case is filed against a foreign defendant, and various
reasons prevent suggestions from being filed in every case, ranging
from capacity constraints to delays in diplomatic communications.
Although foreign governments are permitted to make
submissions directly to U.S. courts, the practice has been for
immunity requests to be submitted via diplomatic channels.402 The
Supreme Court indicated in 1921 that “the correct practice” was for
a foreign government “to make the asserted public status and
immunity of the vessel the subject of diplomatic representations,”
and that if the Executive Branch “recognized” the claim of
immunity, this determination should be “set forth and supported”
in a suggestion by the Attorney General.403 The Court explained
Wuerth, supra note 5, at 939−40.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 41–42.
401 The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
402 See Sovereign Immunity Revisited, 113 ASIL PROC. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with
author) (outlining the remarks of John B. Bellinger III, former U.S. State Department legal
adviser).
403 In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532–33 (1921).
399
400
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that the practice of requesting a suggestion of immunity from the
State Department “makes for better international relations,
conforms to diplomatic usage in other matters, accords to the
Executive Department the respect rightly due to it, and tends to
promote harmony of action and uniformity of decision.”404 These
suggested procedures reflect a desire to reconcile the potentially
competing demands of law and diplomacy within a constitutional
system based on the separation of powers.
Whether contemporary immunity determinations by U.S. courts
should be considered as governed primarily by “reasons of state” or
by “principles of positive law” remains a matter of contention. For
example, in suggesting immunity from suit for Laos’s sitting
president and its prime minister, the United States indicated:
The Constitution assigns to the U.S. President alone the
responsibility to represent the Nation in its foreign
relations. As an incident of that power, the Executive
Branch has the sole authority to determine the
immunity from suit of incumbent heads of state and
heads of government. The interest of the United States
in this matter arises from a determination by the
Executive Branch, in consideration of the relevant
principles of customary international law, and in the
implementation of its foreign policy and in the conduct
of its international relations, that President
Choummaly and Prime Minister Thongsing are
immune from this suit while in office.405
Given this explanation, Executive Branch suggestions of
immunity might best be characterized as hybrid legal—“in light of
the relevant principles of customary international law”—and
political—“in the implementation of its foreign policy and in the
conduct of its international relations”—determinations.406
Id. at 533.
Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States of America,
Hmong I v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, No. 2:15-CV-02349, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12,
2016),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/23-Hmong-I-v.-Lao-PeoplesDemocratic-Republic-U.S.-statement-of-interest.pdf.
406 Id.
404
405
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Lewis Yelin takes the position that suggestions of immunity can
properly be characterized as binding on courts notwithstanding this
apparent hybrid or blended character.407 In his view, suggestions of
status-based immunity for foreign heads of state, such as the one
quoted above, amount to “lawmaking,” because they implement “a
prescriptive rule that can be applied in future cases by the courts”
rather than “purely ad hoc, foreign policy-based decision making.”408
In support of this position, he notes that “although the State
Department has acknowledged foreign relations concerns among its
reasons for recognizing and allowing the immunity of a head of
state, it has generally explained that its determinations of head of
state immunity are based on its adoption and application of the
governing customary international law principles.”409 That said, as
Yelin recounts, “the Executive Branch believes that courts have no
discretion to look behind the suggestion of immunity to determine
for themselves the applicable principles of customary international
law.”410 The hybrid nature of Executive Branch suggestions, which
take into account legal principles but are also informed by foreign
policy considerations, complicates claims about the institutional
competence of the judicial and political branches, respectively, in
making binding immunity determinations. Absent clarifying
legislation, the leap to absolute deference in Peru and Hoffman
seems difficult to defend, especially when a suggestion turns on the
nature of the defendant’s conduct, rather than on his or her official
status.411
See Yelin, supra note 12, at 969.
Id. at 971 n.338.
409 Id.
410 Id. at 973.
411 The Samantar Court did not distinguish between status-based and conduct-based
immunity. It did, however, indicate that “it may be the case that some actions against an
official in his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state, as the
state is the real party in interest.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010). It remains
unclear whether such a suit would be subject to dismissal on common-law immunity grounds,
or whether it would be treated as a suit brought under the FSIA. Cf. Lewis v. Mutond, 918
F.3d 142, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (indicating that “Defendants have not proffered anything to
show that Plaintiff seeks to draw on the DRC’s treasury or force the state to take specific
action, as would be the case if the judgment were enforceable against the state”); see also
Rishikof v. Mortada, 70 F. Supp. 3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that “[t]he salient fact is
that Plaintiff seeks to hold the Swiss Confederation jointly and severally liable for Mortada’s
actions” in fatally injuring a pedestrian in a D.C. crosswalk while driving for official business,
and that in so doing, “Plaintiff—by definition—is seeking to enforce a rule of law against the
Swiss Confederation”); Ex rel. C.G. v. Gutierrez, No. 5:16-CV-00158-BR, 2017 WL 1435720,
at *3 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 21, 2017) (in a vehicular injury case, noting that “[a]lthough defendant
was acting in her official duty as consul at the time of the incident, exercising jurisdiction in
407
408
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C. APPLYING “PRINCIPLES OF POSITIVE LAW”

If the rationale for immunity determinations is not reducible to
“reasons of state,” then courts must also identify “principles of
positive law” to guide their decisions. The starting point for an
analysis of personal jurisdiction, as identified by Chief Justice
Marshall in The Schooner Exchange, remains the plenary territorial
jurisdiction generally exercised by U.S. courts. For example, in
1993, Croat and Muslim victims of atrocities committed by Bosnian
Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina learned that Radovan Karaǆić,
the President of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, was visiting
the United States.412 Unable to pursue redress for their injuries in
Bosnia, they filed civil claims against Karaǆić in a U.S. court,
relying on his physical presence in the United States to justify the
assertion of personal jurisdiction.413 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that “if appellants personally served
Karaǆić with the summons and complaint while he was in New
York,” then the court had personal jurisdiction over him.414
Assuming effective service of process and a viable cause of action,
the question becomes whether a defendant can assert a successful
claim to immunity from the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction. At the
international level, state practice regarding immunities for
individuals accused of conduct such as war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity has been characterized as “in a state of
flux.”415 As a matter of domestic procedure, claims to immunity from
this case does not have the effect of enforcing a rule of law against Mexico as Mexico is not a
named party in this lawsuit and plaintiffs seek to hold defendant alone personally responsible
for her alleged negligence”); Moriah v. Bank of China Ltd., 107 F. Supp. 3d 272, 279 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (finding common-law immunity on the grounds that, among other factors, “if this Court
exercises jurisdiction and issues a subpoena, compelling Ciechanover’s testimony would ‘have
the effect of enforcing a rule of law against the state’” (quoting Heaney v. Gov’t of Spain, 445
F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1971))).
412 See Kadic v. Karaǆić, 70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that the plaintiff
“Croat and Muslim citizens” of Bosnia-Herzegovina—who alleged that they were victims “of
various atrocities” led by Karaǆić—learned that Karaǆić entered the United States in
1933).
413 See id. at 246 (“Appellants aver that Karaǆić was personally served with process while
he was physically present in the Southern District of New York.”).
414 Id. at 248.
415 Jones v. United Kingdom, 2014 Eur. Ct. H. R. 176, ¶ 213 (“State practice on the question
is in a state of flux, with evidence of both the grant and the refusal of immunity ratione
materiae in such cases.”); see also Chimène I. Keitner, Immunities of Foreign Officials from
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civil suit in U.S. courts will generally take the form of a motion to
dismiss the complaint under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.416 Defendants often move to dismiss on a variety of
grounds, and courts are not always clear about whether they are
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction),417 12(b)(2) (lack of jurisdiction),418 or
12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).419 Historically, as indicated above,
conduct-based immunity was treated as an affirmative defense on
the merits because it was based on the argument that the named
defendant did not bear personal responsibility for the challenged
acts.420 In contemporary terms, this sounds more like an argument
for dismissal based on failure to state a claim—or even for summary
judgment—since it takes the view that the claimant would only be
entitled to relief from the foreign state and not the named official.421
One might also treat suggestions of status-based immunity as
determinations that a U.S. court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant because she is entitled to be treated as if she were not
actually present on U.S. territory under the fiction of
“extraterritoriality.” Suggestions of conduct-based immunity
operate somewhat differently. They involve an assertion that
adjudicating the claim would require the court impermissibly to
determine the lawfulness of an authorized official act of a current
or former agent of a foreign government, absent a waiver of

Civil Jurisdiction (“The [European Court of Human Rights] found that it was not ‘manifestly
erroneous’ for the House of Lords to find that an individual official benefits from the state’s
immunity in the civil context, while acknowledging that ‘State practice on the question in in
a state of flux.’” (quoting Jones, 2014 Eur. Ct. H. R. 176, ¶ 213)), in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
ON IMMUNITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tom Ruys & Nicolas Angelet eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2019).
416 See generally Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (reviewing a district court’s
granting of a foreign official’s motion to dismiss because it concluded that the official had
immunity and the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction).
417 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
418 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
419 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
420 See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
421 Cf. Doe 1 v. Buratai, 318 F. Supp. 3d 218, 226 (D.D.C. 2018) (indicating that
“foreign-official immunity is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction”). Some status-based
immunity determinations have been upheld by courts without a motion to dismiss having
been filed. See generally Manoharan v. Rajapaska, 711 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (affirming
the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to validate service in a civil action against the
sitting president of Sri Lanka); Hmong I v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, No. 2:15-CV2349 TLN AC, 2016 WL 2901562 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2016) (denying plaintiff’s motion for
default judgment in a civil action against the president and the prime minister of Laos).
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immunity.422 Whether or not to take a foreign state’s representation
that its agent acted within the scope of lawful authority at face
value could plausibly involve both legal and political considerations.
In the domestic context, U.S. government certifications that a
government official acted within the scope of her authority for
Westfall Act purposes is technically entitled to substantial, but not
absolute, deference.423 As a practical matter, however, such
certifications create obstacles to judicial remedies for international
law violations.424 The same would no doubt be true if foreign
governments—which are generally entitled to immunity under the
FSIA—could unilaterally substitute themselves for their officials as
defendants in U.S. courts.
These questions lead us back to the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in the pivotal Peru and Hoffman cases.425 Although the district
courts in those cases had “authority to determine” for themselves
whether the ships in question were entitled to immunity,426 the
Supreme Court indicated in Peru that they should “relinquish” this
authority “in conformity to [the] overriding principle of substantive
law” that “courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the
seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign, as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations.”427 Consequently, a suggestion of immunity would
be “accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by the
political arm of the Government that the continued [exercise of
jurisdiction] interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign
relations.”428 As the Court subsequently articulated in Hoffman, the
practice of judicial deference to Executive Branch suggestions of
immunity is “founded upon the policy recognized both by the
Department of State and the courts that the national interests will
See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 433–37 (1995) (“[W]e find the
exercise of federal-court authority involved here less ominous than the consequences of
declaring certifications of the kind at issue uncontestable.”).
424 See, e.g., William Casto, Notes on Official Immunity in ATS Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 573, 592 (2011) (indicating that the Westfall Act “effectively immunizes federal officers
who may be sued for violating international law”).
425 See supra Section III.A.
426 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
427 Id.; see also note 375 and accompanying text.
428 Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. at 590.
422
423
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be best served when controversies growing out of the judicial seizure
of vessels of friendly foreign governments are adjusted through
diplomatic channels rather than by the compulsion of judicial
proceedings.”429
These passages from Peru and Hoffman appear to push
immunity determinations towards the “diplomacy” side of the
balance sheet and away from the “law” side—contrary to previously
established practice. They evoke precisely the discretion that the
State Department sought to relinquish in supporting enactment of
the FSIA, but that it claims to retain with regard to determinations
of foreign official immunity.430 That said, the State Department has
never claimed to be untethered from “principles of positive law” in
making immunity determinations, whether these involve foreign
ships or foreign officials. The better reasoned suggestions of
immunity are, the more likely courts will defer to them.
Taking the suggestion of immunity in the Laos case as an
example,431 it remains unclear what the Executive Branch would do
if applying “the relevant principles of customary international law”
produced a result at odds with its assessment of “the United States’
foreign policy and foreign relations interests.”432 It is not always
possible to discern the motivations behind a decision to suggest
immunity, to suggest non-immunity, or to remain silent. The
Executive Branch has declined to recognize claims to head of state
immunity where it has determined that the individual does not
qualify as a sitting head of state.433 If the Executive Branch is silent,
a court can determine for itself whether an individual is a sitting
head of state or head of government entitled to immunity under “the
relevant principles of customary international law,” although it is
less clear that a court would be well-positioned to ascertain the
potential impact of this analysis on “the United States’ foreign
policy and foreign relations interests.” That said, one might expect
to see a suggestion of immunity from the Executive Branch if a case
were deemed to pose a serious threat to the conduct of foreign
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945).
See supra note 397 and accompanying text
431 See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
432 See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
433 See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The Executive
Branch has not merely refrained from taking a position on this matter; to the contrary, by
pursuing Noriega’s capture and this prosecution, the Executive Branch has manifested its
clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied head-of-state immunity.”).
429
430
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policy—assuming that the defendant or the court brings the case to
the Executive Branch’s attention by requesting a suggestion or
seeking its views.434
The question of conduct-based immunity for foreign officials
remains more fraught than that of status-based immunity—both in
terms of its contours under customary international law, and in
terms of the judicial reviewability of State Department
determinations. The Executive Branch has invoked the holding in
Peru and the dicta from Hoffman as precedent indicating a
requirement of absolute deference to suggestions of immunity,
regardless of whether the immunity is status-based or
conduct-based.435 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has held that conduct-based immunity determinations by the
Executive Branch are not “controlling,” but that they do carry
“substantial weight” in a court’s analysis of a defendant’s
entitlement to immunity.436 The Executive Branch, in contrast, has
cited Hoffman for “the basic principle that Executive Branch
immunity determinations establish ‘substantive law governing the
exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts’”437 and are therefore
binding on courts.
The language in Hoffman does not support the view that the
State Department creates a “substantive rule of law” when it makes
an immunity determination. Rather, the Supreme Court in that
case cited Peru for the proposition that “it is an accepted rule of
434 See, e.g., Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity, Rosenberg v.
Lashkar-e-Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05381-DLI-CP, at *9 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012),
http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/Rosenberg-Suggestion-of-Immunity-12-17-12.pdf
(“[B]ecause a foreign state’s request for immunity on behalf of an official itself has foreign
relations implications, courts should ensure that the Executive Branch has been notified of
and had an opportunity to consider such a request before ruling on the immunity issue.
Indeed, for that reason, a foreign state’s request for an official’s immunity should first be
presented to the Department of State, not to the court.”).
435 See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States of
America, supra note 405, at 8.
436 Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773 (4th Cir. 2012). By contrast, a Second Circuit
panel held in an unpublished opinion that, under applicable circuit precedent, Executive
determinations of foreign official immunity are binding on the courts. See Matar v. Dichter,
563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009) (representing a pre-Samantar case applying “our traditional
rule of deference to such Executive determinations” of immunity).
437 See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity by the United States, Doğan v. Barak, No. 2:15-CV08130-ODW-GJS, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2016) (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

75

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 6

292

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:217

substantive law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the
courts that they accept and follow [an] executive determination that
[a friendly foreign] vessel is immune.”438 In other words, courts’
practice of judicial deference is the rule of “substantive law,” not the
immunity determination itself. This reading is reinforced by the
Hoffman Court’s statement that it found “no persuasive ground for
allowing the immunity in [that] case, an important reason being
that the State Department has declined to recognize it.”439 This
interpretation conforms with the Peru court’s framing of the
immunity question as involving “whether the jurisdiction which the
court had already acquired by seizure of the vessel should have been
relinquished in conformity to an overriding principle of substantive
law.”440 That “overriding principle” was that “courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the
property of a friendly sovereign, as to embarrass the executive arm
of the government in conducting foreign relations.”441 As the Cassius
case demonstrated early on, the seizure of a foreign vessel could
indeed create a foreign relations headache.442 Courts can take
foreign relations considerations into account if they are raised by
the Executive Branch.
It is indisputable that a tradition of judicial deference to
Executive Branch suggestions of immunity emerged by the early
1940s and was endorsed by the Supreme Court at that time.443 It
remains more doubtful, however, that the Supreme Court’s
description of that tradition in the Samantar opinion and its
indication that Congress did not intend to “displace” the common
law of foreign official immunity when it enacted the FSIA can
properly be read as a holding that absolute judicial deference to all
determinations of foreign official immunity is constitutionally
compelled. The deference question remains unresolved at the U.S.
Supreme Court level.
Whether the Executive Branch has the constitutional authority
to make status-based immunity determinations that are binding on
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36.
Id. at 36 n.1 (emphasis added).
440 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943)
441 Id.
442 See supra Section II.C.
443 See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity,
Individual Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 11 (2009) (indicating
that “starting in the late 1930s, courts began to give essentially absolute deference to
Executive Branch views on whether immunity should be granted”).
438
439
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the courts could hypothetically arise if the Executive Branch made
a determination of non-immunity for a sitting head of state,
contrary to established principles of customary international law.444
The question of the Executive Branch’s constitutional authority to
make binding conduct-based immunity determinations arises when
a defendant urges a court to dismiss a case notwithstanding an
Executive Branch suggestion of non-immunity, or when a claimant
urges a court to retain jurisdiction notwithstanding a suggestion of
immunity.445 In the former scenario, which recalls the Berizzi Bros.
case, the degree of deference owed might depend on whether the
proffered rationale for non-immunity turns on legal considerations,
diplomatic considerations, or both. In the latter scenario, if an
Executive Branch suggestion of conduct-based immunity does not
run counter to established principles of customary international law
and invokes facially plausible foreign relations reasons for declining
to exercise jurisdiction over the claim, most judges will likely defer
to that determination, even if they indicate they are according it
only “substantial,” rather than controlling, weight.446
The extent to which one feels comfortable with the prospect of a
U.S. court declining to defer to an Executive Branch suggestion of
444 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 53–54 (Feb. 2002) (finding that the
incumbent Congolese foreign minister was entitled to status-based immunity from criminal
prosecution by a Belgian court because, like an incumbent head of state, an incumbent foreign
minister is entitled to protection “throughout the duration of his or her office” from “any act
of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her
duties”).
445 For example, the Doğan court explained:
The Judiciary does not defer to the Executive because of any perceived
requirement that it must. Rather, the Judiciary chose to adopt a policy of
deference simply as a matter of logic and comity. Lawsuits concerning a
foreign nation’s official acts and instrumentalities inevitably implicate our
diplomatic relationship with that nation. Thus, the Supreme Court
concluded [in Republic of Peru that] “our national interest will be better
served in such cases if the wrongs to suitors, involving our relations with a
friendly foreign power, are righted through diplomatic negotiations rather
than by the compulsions of judicial proceedings.”
Doğan v. Barak, No. 2:15-cv-08130-ODW(GSJx), 2016 WL 5947236, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 13, 2016), aff’d, 932 F. 3d 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Republic of Peru, 318 U.S.
at 589) (affirming the result without determining the required degree of deference).
446 See Doğan, 2016 WL 6024416, at *9 (deferring to an Executive Branch suggestion of
immunity, while noting that “[e]ven if the Court conducted an independent inquiry on the
immunity question, it would reach the same conclusion”).
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conduct-based immunity turns to a large extent on which scenario
one finds more problematic: a U.S. court declining to provide a
forum to adjudicate allegations of egregious human rights abuses
that were authorized or endorsed by a foreign state, or both;447 or a
U.S. court providing such a forum over the objections of the foreign
state and the Executive Branch.448 To the extent that conduct-based
immunity determinations by the Executive Branch involve
considerations of both law and diplomacy, it seems that the
Executive Branch’s ability to put a heavy thumb on the scale—but
not to compel dismissal of a suit based on an intrinsically opaque
assessment of relevant considerations—best accommodates
potentially conflicting concerns in the absence of applicable
legislation.
In addition to privately initiated civil suits, there are a variety of
contexts in which imposing legal consequences on foreign officials
for their conduct serves, rather than undermines, current U.S.
foreign policy goals, from U.S. indictments of foreign
state-sponsored hackers449 to U.S. support for other countries’
attempts to prosecute Syrian war criminals.450 As courts consider
the contours of common law immunity for foreign officials who are
sued in U.S. courts, they should remain mindful of the potential

447 The Department of Justice indicated in a suggestion of conduct-based immunity for a
claim brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act that
[o]n their face, acts of defendant foreign officials who are sued for exercising
the powers of their office are treated as acts taken in an official capacity, and
plaintiffs have provided no reason to question that determination . . . . The
per se rule of nonimmunity [for violations of peremptory norms of
international law] adopted by the Fourth Circuit is not drawn from any
determination made or principles articulated by the Executive Branch.
Suggestion of Immunity by the United States, Doğan, 2016 WL 5947236, at *9.
448 For example, certain cases against foreign states and their officials can proceed under
legislation opposed at the time of its enactment by the Executive Branch based on concerns
about its impact on foreign relations. See, e.g., Veto Message from the President−S.2040,
White
House
Office
of
the
Press
Secretary
(Sept.
23,
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/veto-message-presidents2040 (vetoing Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which Congress enacted after
overriding the veto).
449 See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Attribution by Indictment, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 207, 207
(2019) (describing U.S. practice).
450 See Press Statement, Robert J. Palladino, Support for Germany’s Request for Lebanon
to
Extradite
Syrian
General
Jamil
Hassan
(Mar.
5,
2019),
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/03/290011.htm (stating that “the United States
supports effective mechanisms for holding those responsible for atrocities in Syria
accountable”).
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doctrinal reverberations of their determinations in these other
contexts.451
IV. CONCLUSION
U.S. courts have grappled with disputes arising at the
intersection of law and diplomacy since the Founding Era. Although
the line from eighteenth-century cases against privateers to
twentieth-century cases against human rights abusers might not
seem self-evident, these cases raise many of the same conceptual
and doctrinal issues for U.S. courts. If Henry Sinclair had been a
pirate rather than a privateer, he could not have argued that “a
commission from the sovereign of a foreign nation” shielded him
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.452 Two centuries later, the court
of appeals in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala famously considered a civil suit
brought by two Paraguayan citizens against a former Paraguayan
official, who was served with process in New York, for torture and
extrajudicial killing that occurred in Paraguay.453 The court
reasoned that “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”454 Despite this
reasoning, some foreign defendants who are sued in U.S. courts
argue, like Sinclair, that their conduct was authorized—and can
only be judged—by their own governments. As long as such
defendants continue to come within the personal jurisdiction of U.S.
courts, they will continue to raise claims to common law immunity.
This Article has offered an account of strategies used by litigants,
judges, legislators, and executive branch officials to navigate
tensions between rules-based approaches to jurisdictional
immunity administered by the judiciary and case-by-case
approaches administered by the political branches. Despite the

451 Cf. Chimène I. Keitner, Prosecute, Sue, or Deport? Transnational Accountability in
International
Law,
165
U.
PA.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
1,
1–4
(2015),
https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-1.pdf (indicating a range of
policies that impose consequences on individuals for unlawful conduct, even if they acted on
behalf of foreign states).
452 Charles Lee, Actions Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797).
453 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
454 Id. at 890.
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perceived advantages of determinacy, preserving some room for
continued inter-branch dialogue around questions of common law
immunity seems both doctrinally and normatively warranted as our
understandings of personal responsibility for “official acts,” and the
consequences that flow from that responsibility, continue to evolve.
The best way to preserve this space for dialogue, which is also most
consistent with the historical understandings explored here, is for
courts to accord significant, but not absolute, deference to Executive
Branch suggestions of conduct-based immunity from suit.
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